The annual discussion held in Munich this year mainly concentrated on the Syrian civil war. The issue is pressing since the flow of Syrian refugees exacerbates the political situation in Europe as well as in the Middle East. In his speech, Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev shared his concerns about the world entering a new Cold War (Munich Security Conference, 2016). That Dmitri Medvedev’s enigmatic reference to the Cold War was a mere figure of speech seems doubtful.
One has to remember that the Cold War, albeit off-the-record, was a struggle for influence conducted surreptitiously (Keylor, 2011). Be it economic pressures, diplomacy maneuvers, or acts of war in third countries, it has tried to escape a head-to-head confrontation. Both sides realized such collision would cause a nuclear war – although there were occasions when the Apocalypse seemed unavoidable (Keylor, 2011).
The current situation invokes reasonable questions on the nature of the so-called “New Cold War”: whether it is worth recollecting the 20th-century conflict to understand the emerging one, and whether it is the long-standing political quarrel springing back into existence or something new. It appears, however, that the reference to the “Cold War”, although historically educational, can provide only an analogized understanding of the current situation and hardly derives a more or less adequate prognosis.
It is worth remembering that the Cold War has always unfolded inconspicuously. The US and Russia never attacked each other officially; nevertheless, the number of proxy wars, the arms race, and the ideological crackdowns in third countries indicates the struggle for influence was present. Among the causes urging the US to take action was the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. The policy presupposed communist countries to assist each other in spreading communism over the world. Such conflicts as the Korean one brought forth the anticipation of World War III, with the US forced to curb the communist ideology by military force (Keylor 2011).
Not more than a decade after the Korean conflict, the USSR established their missiles in Cuba that has only just turned to communism. The threat of a nuclear holocaust was tangible, when the states came to a mutual agreement and withdrew their missiles from Cuba and Turkey, respectively (Keylor 2011). Nevertheless, the posture of Russia and the actions towards former Soviets have been still regarded in terms of the Cold War after the USSR has dissolved and the Cold War was Over.
The conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine were met with contempt, and talks about the new Cold War were raised but there is a major point of divergence that makes the analogy somewhat inconsistent. Russia’s actions in the third countries were not initially aimed at pecking the US or the EU; in addition, no actions from the latter were taken to prevent the conflicts (Harasymiw, 2010).
In his search for either a confirmation or contradiction to the idea of a new Cold War, Harasymiw (2010) discusses the missiles initiatives of both powers, emphasizing the “deep suspicion” that the Russian military still meet every US’s action (p. 12). The stagnated cold-war-style mentality of the Russian government, the author states, had resulted in a tension of relationships that was not reset until Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential term. President Obama and resident Medvedev have managed to overpower the reciprocal distrust – or so it seemed – replacing it with a civilized dialog that eased the flow of references to the Cold War (Harasymiw, 2010).
After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the analysts and media commentators started to press the topic of the New Cold War, or the Cold War II (Kalb, 2015). The issues of President Putin’s autocracy, his motivations, and the relationships of Russia and the US were raised. Such discourse created a twofold picture: Russia had to be either appeased or countered. The world’s suspicion towards Russia’s actions in Syria might or might not be justified, although Prime Minister Medvedev advocates for Russia’s struggle for global security just as any other state would do (Munich Security Conference, 2016).
The threats put before the US, EU, NATO, and the New World Order are multiple, the major one being terrorism – the one that cannot be tackled without cooperation and enhancement of security. The post-Cold War era implies thinking in post-Cold War terms. The images of Russia emerging a new Cold War do not make its policies and motivations more understandable; instead, they assume that Russia has not developed its strategies or arms since the USSR downfall – an assumption that can be disastrous if accepted as true.
Thus, thinking analogically and parallelizing the current situation with history does not account for the full picture. Instead of merely assuming a second Cold War, it is from the position of new policies and enhanced capabilities that the Russian annexations and suspicious actions in Syria should be regarded. But still, although analogizing the policies and implications with a historical period and legacy is hardly efficient, the question of what is it that Russia wants remains pressing.
References
Harasymiw, B. (2010). Russia, the United States, and the New Cold War. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 12(2), 1-31.
Kalb, M. (2015). Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Keylor, W. R. (2011). The Twentieth-century World and Beyond: An International History Since 1900, 6th ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Munich Security Conference. (2016). Web.