Following Doctorow, the twentieth century marked new relations between an individual and the state characterized by close and intimate relations. Thus, these relations were not positive or mutual based on strict totalitarian control of the government. At the most fundamental level, such societies are characterized by a lack of social control, a product both of the political incapacitation of the regime, and magnified and intense revolutionary social change. Political activity takes place within a context of changing social and political symbols, the very perceptions that society has of the state having greatly changed. Increased political participation aimed at capturing state institutions in turn polarizes diverging social and political tendencies, while at the same time enhancing the power of independent conceptualization. Efforts aimed at wresting political power away from the regime, meanwhile, result in the development of a host of norms and values supporting political struggle.
Following war and peace theory, the relations between the individual and the government were based on the necessity to protect the state from enemies and use citizens as the military power to struggle against the enemies. Specifically, a heightened sense of nationalism and a symbolic upholding of the value of martyrdom become strikingly prevalent, particularly among those social groups who were at the forefront of the political struggle. The society, in essence, becomes just as revolutionized as the state (Brose, p. 36). Cultural orientations, mores, and norms change, particularly those which relate to political activity, with new symbols replacing the old. A new political culture emerges, and is in turn cultivated by the regime, with mass-based political activism as its core value. Political input is on the one hand encouraged by the emerging inclusionary state and, on the other hand, desired by masses unwilling to forfeit their newly-found political liberties.
The emergence of new ideologies marked a new stage in social development. Communism and fascism were based on close relations between individuals and the state but in both cases, the state exploited individuals and used them as the driven force for social changes. Despite the appearance of complementarity, the mutual desire of both state and society for popular political input has the potential of engendering conflict. For while the inclusionary state aims at encouraging controlled forms of participation, not all social actors desire to partake in guided displays of political expression. The internal conflicts among competing heirs to the revolution which characterize post-revolutionary states in their initial phases of establishment in turn resonate to a conflict of the same nature between social actors and the state (Robert, p. 137). Since revolutions lead to a temporary collapse of the repressive capacities of the government, they invariably result in a period of non-existent or at best minimal social control. Society has become liberated, not just politically but culturally as well. It is embroiled in a process of formulating new values and symbols, new patterns of conduct and new expectation (Friedlander, p. 145). Totalitarian societies are often marred by coercive and brutal attempts on the part of new elites to establish social control. With a zeal and determination uncharacteristic of past regimes, new elites seek to inculcate among the populace those values and norms which they consider to be the correct ones. These new values form the basis of their legitimacy, and their popular acceptance is central to the success of the new regime. The inherently conflictual nature of the relationship between post-revolutionary states and societies does not, at least initially, necessarily translate into political violence. What occurs is more a clash of values, a conflict between values designed to legitimize specific political forms on the one hand and those expressed in rebellion against previously dominant cultural frames of reference on the other (Robert, p. 137). The overt violence which plagues post-revolutionary states is often a product of internal squabbles among various political elites. Nevertheless, culturally-induced political violence in post-revolutionary settings is a possibility. The quest for political correctness, compellingly pursued by post-revolutionary states, translates into rigid social agendas within which, it is presumed by the governments involved, the legitimacy of the new order is embedded. The reigns of terror that follow revolutions are not just dark political experiences; they are as much projects designed to mold or to at least contain perceived social and cultural non-conformists. Calls for cultural vigilance become part and parcel of post-revolutionary life (Friedlander, p. 147).
Liberal democracy and nationalism give certain freedom to individuals thus stipulate strict control of the state. While the attainment of political consolidation may be central to such projects, their penetrative social and cultural affects cannot be overlooked. But post-revolutionary societies succumb to the cultural edicts of their new rulers only grudgingly at best, the threat of being branded “counter-revolutionary” hanging over the heads of all non-conformists (Robert, p. 139). Yet outbursts of defiance and overt opposition do exist. The violence which accompanied the imposition of moral codes by Iran’s victorious revolutionaries is a striking illustration of culturally-based frictions which entangle post-revolutionary polities. The tensions which accompany the inculcation of a new cultural frame of reference are compounded by characteristics which post-revolutionary societies themselves assume as a result of the revolutionary experience. Specifically, the divisions which invariably characterize all societies become polarised as a result of the revolutionary experience. While there are no definitive links between ordinary forms of political participation (such as voting or membership in parties) and factional polarization. polarization does occur within a context (Lewin 66).Due to the tumults and intensity of the revolutionary struggle, social, political, and ideological cleavages become polarized, each faction or camp more determined not only to survive in the hostile post-revolutionary atmosphere but also to legitimize itself as the rightful heir of the revolution. Frictions and subtle maneuvers, carried out with a sense of gentility for the sake of a semblance of unity, soon give way to conflicts which increasingly assume something of a sectarian character (Lewin, p. 66).
In sum, relations between the state and individuals were close and intimate but they were based on strict total control of the government over lives of all citizens. Social and cultural values are deeply held and concern people’s private attitudes and thoughts, it takes longer for new, dominant cultural forms to emerge, and even longer for them to take hold (McCagg, p.54). Social mosaics break apart, not to be reconstructed until well after new leaders can enforce their own cultural hegemony. People with differing orientations vie for greater cultural hegemony, attempting to mold the emerging norms of the New Society according to their own orientations and perceptions (Robert, p.138). Apart from the new political direction which post-revolutionary states try to lead their societies in, there is an attempt from within postrevolutionary societies to rethink cultural priorities, reformulate dominant values, and redirect social energies. At the least, there are efforts by distinct social groups and segments to superimpose their own cultural values and perceptions on the larger society (Lewin, p.63).
Following Burleigh and Wippermann (177), “community aliens” were a burden for society and the state. This politicization is achieved not only through the attempts of revolutionary leaders to mobilize previously docile masses via propaganda and manipulation, but also through the self-perpetuating nature of political participation. Political participation, and at its heart exposure to political information (tainted and biased as that information may be), enhances the ability to conceptualize and to develop more abstract understandings of the political system. The relationship between mass political participation and the rhetorical demagoguery that permeates political life in Nazi Germany is a fundamental one. Mass mobilization, exposure to risks, a sense of self-righteousness, the semblance of participatory democracy, and the sheer weight of the revolution as a dramatic historical event all lead to the development of a collective identity and solidarity which revolve around the revolutionary experience. But the manipulation of popular nationalist feelings becomes central to the consolidation of power against domestic enemies also, with non-conformists and dissidents being branded as traitors working to undermine the integrity of the motherland. More importantly, nationalist sentiments are often called on to justify the economic sacrifices which post-revolutionary states ask of their citizens (Weinberg, p. 55).
Demands for continued participation in the political process become reutilized under inclusionary systems, concern with the fine aesthetics of political practice giving way to the realities of everyday life. The level of political discourse and conceptualization remain high, at least compared to pre-revolutionary times, but still carefully eyed by the political establishment. Perhaps most importantly, the conflictual relationship between the state and society turns into a consensual one, even if based upon force rather than voluntary compliance. In other words, the political culture of the state begins to take hold, forming the dominant milieu within which state-society relations are formulated (Weinberg 58. This politicization of everyday life is in turn reinforced by a popular desire to seek for absolute truths in political terms. This is a population that has just been through a revolution, having a simplified perception of the historic, political dynamics that are at work. It sees few in-betweens, its universe revolving around resolute political dogmas that were hardened in the process of revolutionary mobilization and the ensuing, invariably bloody struggle. Both immediately prior to and after the revolution, the distinction between non-political and politically relevant events becomes increasingly blurred. Even natural disasters and other strictly non-political phenomena are somehow linked to the performance and the overall nature of the body politic (Burleigh and Wippermann, p. 178).
“The community aliens” were important for the society as they unveiled social problems and weaknesses of the regime. They were considerably different from the static and inert cultures that they replaced. Not only were their symbolic representations different, but so were their basic tenets in terms of popular perceptions of the body politic. In the political systems that develop after successful social changes, people envisioned themselves as participants in a democratic process, although the political arena may indeed be highly rigid and stifling (Woolf, p. 71). The political culture, those popular perceptions that people have of the political establishment, is dramatically changed (Weinberg, p. 58). People perceive the political system much more favorably, and in fact see the act of engaging in politics in a completely different light. No longer is “politicking” frowned on as it was prior to the revolution, no longer are politicians seen as vain and corrupt. Politics becomes a passionate field of activity devoted to the betterment of mankind; its artisans, the politicians, are revolutionary heroes committed to bringing about a better life. People identify with these rebels-cum-leaders much more readily. They feel, on the whole, closer to the political establishment, indeed perceiving themselves as an integral part of the political process (Weinberg, p. 57).
In Nazi Germany, “community aliens” were important social group seeing in opposition opt the society. They were seen as an enemy and a direct threat to other citizens, so the role of the government was to protect loyal and honest people from the Others. The existence of a number of elites, either does not exclude conflict and group activity at the middle or lower levels of the system. Party secretaries, factory managers, government executives, directors of scientific institutions, army generals, trade union leaders, who all hold official positions of one kind or another, are, if the conclusions of political science are to be given any credibility, likely to form their own professional sectional view of the public good. Such men are likely to intermingle with others of a similar occupational role and on that basis to advocate and to support policies which they believe to be in their interest. “Community aliens” were used as one of the issues which legitimized totalitarian control of the government over lives of citizens and their relations. “Community aliens” were those which may share a given occupation, or a similar social or national position but which were only partially conscious of their own identity and which have little opportunity for interest articulation.
References
- Burleigh, M., Wippermann, W. The Racial State. Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Brose, E. Europe in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Friedlander, H. ‘The Exclusion and Murder of the Disabled’, in Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany, ed. Robert Gellately and Nathan Stoltzfus (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), Ch 7, pp. 145-164
- Lewin, Moshe. “Stalin in the Mirror of the Other. ” In Russia/USSR/Russia. New York: New Press, 1995.
- McCagg, William O.Stalin Embattled, 1943–1948. Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1978.
- Robert W. Thurston, Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia 1934-1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), esp. chapter 5, pp. 137-163.
- Weinberg, Gerhard. The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Starting World War II, 1937— 1939. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
- Woolf, S. J., ed. Fascism in Europe. London and New York: Methuen, 1981.