One of the most peculiar characteristics of today’s living is the fact that, as time goes on; there appears to be more and more incidents of American military being called upon to assist people, affected by natural/man-made disasters in U.S. and abroad.
The validity of this suggestion can be well illustrated in regards to the crucial role that military personnel played, while participating in search-and-rescue operations in the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and in regards to how American soldiers went about helping civilians in world’s regions that used to be affected by civil war, such as Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo.
And, as practice indicates, the foremost characteristic of U.S. military’s involvement in humanitarian disasters’ management has always been the utter efficiency in how it addressed its tasks, in this respect. For example, as it appears from Haulman’s (2007) article, FEMA’s cooperation with U.S.
Air Force, while rescuing the survived victims of hurricane Katrina, had proven quite indispensible: “Between August 31 and September 10, USAF helicopter crews rescued 4,322 people… “(p. 43). At the same time, however, the very fact that U.S. military appears to play ever-increasing role in natural/man-made disasters’ mitigation, raises certain concerns – after all, the primary function of just about any country’s army has always been bringing death and destruction upon the enemy.
And, it is needless to mention, of course, that such function is being quite inconsistent with conceptual essence of humanitarian missions, associated with providing disaster-affected people with much needed relief. In this paper, we will aim to reach the following objectives: to show that U.S. military’s continuous involvement in managing humanitarian crises has been dialectically predetermined and to outline what can be considered pros and cons of such an involvement.
As we are being well aware of, the policy of multiculturalism has been institutionalized in America for close to forty years now. However, despite the official assumption that this policy is being utterly beneficial to society’s well-being, as it helps to diversify it, there are a number of negative aspects to the process of American society continuing to grow increasingly diversified.
The most important of them is the fact that the multiculturalization of American society does in fact result in undermining its inner integrity to a considerable extent. This is exactly the reason why, as of today, the occurrence of natural disasters on American soil does not only result in citizens’ lives and property being destroyed, but very often in inducing the continuous state of social chaos in the affected areas.
According to Nel and Righarts (2008): “In multicultural societies, natural disasters significantly increase the risk of violent civil conflict both in the short and medium term” (p. 159). The soundness of this idea has been illustrated in the aftermath of 2005 hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, when thousands and thousands of Black and Hispanic survivors became solely preoccupied with looting – hence, contributing to the graveness of a situation rather considerably.
As it was pointed out by Garfield (2007): “In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, rampant black criminality was reported in news accounts… the emergency response – framed largely within the context of ‘urban warfare’ – was aimed at restoring law-and-order to a city” (p. 58).
Therefore, it comes as not a particular surprise that, while being confronted with the reports of law and order in post-hurricane New Orleans having deteriorated to the point of non-existence, high-ranking governmental officials realized that FEMA alone would not be able to effectively address the situation.
Even as early as within the matter of few days, after Katrina, it became perfectly clear to these officials that, while dealing with hurricane’s consequences, they would have to be primarily focused on trying to prevent the escalation of a natural disaster into humanitarian/complex emergency, as defined by Albala-Bertrand (2000):
“The key feature of a long lasting complex emergency is the societal/institutional weakness that fails to accommodate entrenched and violent competing identity groups, while the key characteristic of a natural disaster is the physical weakness of structures and processes that fails to compensate for extreme natural event” (p. 216).
The logical way to tackle the issue, in this respect, was dispatching National Guards to the affected area, not only to indulge in search-and-rescue operations but also to ensure victims’ security.
In its turn, this highlights what can be considered the greatest advantage of utilizing military units in humanitarian missions, as compared to what it is being the case with NGOs under civilian authority: soldiers’ very presence in disaster-affected areas results in reestablishing law and order – the foremost precondition the ensures the effectiveness of these missions.
As it was noted by Kelly (1996): “Military police or combat units can establish or maintain security for disaster relief operations” (p. 24). This is exactly the reason why, due to the social effects of ‘celebration of diversity’ in America, sending military to assist the victims of natural disasters in this country had effectively ceased to be an option.
There is also a purely technical consideration, in favor of using military in humanitarian search-and-rescue operations, quite unrelated what has been said earlier – when it comes to helping the victims of natural/man-made disasters, army personnel enjoys a huge advantage in terms of logistics.
According to Joyce (2006): “What they (military personnel) do have are material and logistical resources, including helicopters and vehicles for delivery of supplies and transportation, tents, food, water, and supplies for accommodation of victims” (p. 67). Unlike what it is being often the case with relief agencies under civilian authority, military never experiences the shortage of technical means to ensure the effectiveness of conducted relief-related operations.
Moreover, as practice shows, military professionals often prove to be the only ones adequately qualified to conduct these operations under extreme weather conditions. According to Millie et al. (2000), it was due to the quick response, on the part of U.S. military, that many victims of F3 tornado, which struck southeastern Georgia in 1998, were able to save their lives: “Military airlift was utilized because civilian medical flights were initially grounded as a result of the storm itself” (p. 227).
Apparently, whatever often appear ‘impossible’ to civilian rescuers, military rescuers consider ‘difficult but doable’. There is one more important pro to utilizing military, when it comes to crisis management – the fact that, unlike what it often appears to be the case with the members of organizations under civilian authority, military personnel is being largely prone to corruption.
And, as practice indicates, the areas affected by natural or man-made disasters can often be referred to as corruption’s ‘breeding pools’. As it was pointed out by Shughart (2011): “The ‘windfall’ of money and other resources that pours into a disaster’s impact area, the chaotic atmosphere in which relief is distributed, and the public-relations imperative to be seen ‘doing something’ quickly to alleviate the suffering creates circumstances ripe for corruption and waste” (p. 521).
For example, as it was revealed by Medias, while trying to help the victims of hurricane Katrina, the civilian authorities in the affected area used to assign just about anyone who would present itself as a ‘ready-to-work nurse’ with brand-new SUVs, without even keeping a record of it. In military, however, those suspected of taking monetary advantage of suffering people, during the course of some emergency situations, are being dealt with by court-martials.
According to Marshall (2007): “The military has a well-developed protocol for disasters that clearly spells out the chain of command with disciplinary consequences for not following the plan” (p.1). This is why, sending military units to disaster-affected areas, to provide victims with relief, also proves extremely cost-effective.
Nevertheless, there are also some objections to the idea that relying upon military’s assistance, while dealing with natural/man-made disasters, represents a fully legitimate practice. One of these objections is being articulated by Kelly, in the article from which we have already quoted: “The use of force can place military units in direct conflict with local populations – the people they are supposedly there to help” (p. 24).
This appears to be especially the case in Third World countries, ravaged by never-ending tribal wars, where American soldiers are being often sent on humanitarian missions. In its turn, this result in strengthening anti-American sentiment worldwide – this can be hardly considered beneficial to America’s national security.
What is even worse is that, while participating in humanitarian rearch-and-rescue missions, the military units are being deprived of their combat-readiness, as the consequence. The reason for this is simple – there are only two states in which army can exist: waging war or preparing to wage war.
Outside of these states, the very existence of an army does not make any sense, whatsoever. This is the reason why even military defensive strategies are being deeply imbedded in the concept of preventive assault. As it was noted by Reitan (1994): “Organizing defensive violence by creating a military force designed for public defense… does lead inevitably to the practice of violence against combatants who are not in the immediate act of initiating or practicing an unjust assault” (p.120).
What it means that, once the operational functioning of a particular military unit in peacetime ceases to be concerned with preparing for war, it becomes only the matter of time before this unit ceases to represent a combat-value. For example, given the fact that Soviet soldiers used to be forced to indulge in a variety of agricultural activities, such as digging out potatoes, it comes as not a surprise that the casualty rate in frontline-stationed Soviet army’s units has always been one of world’s highest.
Therefore, there are good reasons to believe that if U.S. military continues to be utilized in humanitarian operations, concerned with helping the victims of natural/man-made disasters, this will result in the extent of its combat-effectiveness being significantly undermined.
As we have suggested in the Introduction, there are a number of objective preconditions for U.S. Army to be continuously involved in civilian crisis management in America and abroad. We believe that the provided line of argumentation, in defense of this suggestion, confirms the validity of paper’s initial thesis.
Apparently, there are indeed many reasons to expect U.S. military being affiliated with providing relief to the victims of natural/man-made disasters into the future. And, as we have pointed out earlier – there is a number of advantages and disadvantages to that. Therefore, it would only be logical to conclude that the policy-makers, in position to deploy military to participate in search-and-rescue efforts, must never lose a sight of an earlier outlined pros and cons.
References
Garfield, G. (2007). Hurricane Katrina: The making of unworthy disaster victims. Journal of African American Studies, 10 (4), 55-74.
Haulman, D. (2007). The U.S. Air Force response to hurricane Katrina. Air Power History, 54 (3), 40-47.
Joyce, N. (2006). Civilian-military coordination in the emergency response in Indonesia. Military Medicine, (171), 66-82.
Kelly, C. (1996). Limitations of military resources for foreign disaster assistance. Disaster Prevention and Management, 5 (1), 22-29.
Malbala-Bertrand, J. (2000). Responses to complex humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters: An analytical comparison. Third World Quarterly, 21(2), 215–227.
Marshall, M. (2007). The next disaster: Are you ready? Perspectives in Psychiatric Care, 43 (1), 1-2.
Millie, M. at el. (2000). Tornado disaster in rural Georgia: Triage response, injury patterns, lessons learned. American Surgeon, 66 (3), 223-228.
Nel, P. & Righarts, M. (2008). Natural disasters and the risk of violent civil conflict. International Studies Quarterly, 52(1), 159-185.
Reitan, E. (1994). The irreconcilability of pacifism and just war theory: A response to Sterba. Social Theory & Practice, 20(2), 117-134.
Shughart, W. (2011). Disaster relief as bad public policy. Independent Review, 15 (4), 519-539.