Introduction
Electrical Safety is a part of industrial safety programs aimed to protect workers and outside environment from threats and risks. The electrical safety regulation involves congressional legislation stating the need to protect health, safety, and the environment; setting goals for improvements in the present condition; and establishing the commissions to deal with the day-to-day problems of actually achieving the goals. Once established, the new agencies attempt to settle quickly into full-blown and efficient administrative processes. While the legislation provided guidelines as to why the agency should proceed, it usually does specify the method or process of regulation.
Main text
Electricity is dangerous for a human causing death and health hazards. If a current runs through a human body it burns the flesh and causes the shock. In its turn, shock leads to heart attack and heart failure. One-tenth of an ampere may prove death if it passes through the main part of the body. “Of all the skin layers, keratin exhibits the highest resistance to the passage of electricity” (Cadick et al 2005, p. 1.20).
For instance, the 110 volts is enough to be fatal. in industrial setting, electricity is dangerous because it causes rapid heating and expansion of sap vapors in case of fire. In current, “electrons move because they push on each other to spread apart. When more electrons are in one place than another, those in the crowded area push harder than those in the emptier area, so electrons move from the former to the latter. Resistance is modeled as a blocking process in which “imperfections” in the material act as obstacles in the electrons’ paths” (McCutchen 1999, p. 259).
In industrial settings, electricity is dangerous because of high voltage and metal constructions used in many plants and factories. “Employees who work around electricity don’t survive on luck. Worse is the fact that having a near death accident doesn’t “feel” lucky to most” (Cadick et al 2005, p. 8.14). The regulation of worker safety goes toward specifying equipment. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 is enacted to reverse the rising trend of worker accidents during the 1960s. When the act became law, the secretary of labor set the first safety standards based on equipment specifications arrive at over the previous two decades by industry health associations and nonprofit safety organizations (Viscusi 2000).
Today, electrical safety issues contain extremely detailed specifications of the physical conditions of production, ranging from the cleanliness of the working area to the position and size of mesh screens over moving machinery. The goals are to set in terms of improving health and safety across the country, EPA, NHTSA, and OSHA regulations evolved away from performance to setting out and partially enforcing detailed equipment specifications (Viscusi 2000).
Because standard setting has been litigious and prolonged, the existing set of rules has not been complete. But these regulations when available and applied to the individual plant have proven to be extremely detailed and inflexible. When they have not fit, the only way to resolve an all-or-nothing confrontation has been to postpone application. in utility and industrial settings, ”electricity is conducted along copper wires in power generation, transmission, and distribution” (Cadick et al 2005, p. 11.8).
By controlling equipment and production processes, the agencies regulating electrical safety have had some impact on industry costs and prices. Electrical safety concerns logically fall into four basic categories: product design standards, installation standards, safety-related maintenance information and usage instructions “(Cadick et al 2005, p. 6.16). The impact is realized by the companies in higher equipment costs and reduced equipment options. This, in turn, increases the long-run, and increases the short-run, costs of production. Behavior modification approaches to workplace safety invoke a domino model, such that reinforcement strategies affect safe behavior, which in turn affects accident rates.
Following Patterson (1999), the simplest form of event sequence model accords less attention to causes and more attention to the outcomes leading up to an accident. The nuance here is that an accident is a process, rather than a single discrete event. Patterson (1999) conceptualizes the accident process as a hazard buildup cycle. At first, the workplace is safe with no uncontrolled hazards. As people start to work, however, tools are left out in work spaces, and different people enter the work space to do different things with different tools and equipment. People and objects move around and make opportunities to bump into each other.
Eventually hazards accumulate to a critical level when an accident occurs. Notice that there is a entropy concept implicit in the hazard buildup view of an accident process. For instance, in industrial settings: “whenever possible, safety grounds are applied to create a zone of equal potential around the employee. This means that the voltage is equal on all components within reach of the employee” (Cadick et al 2005, p. 2.84).
An intervention based on the hazard buildup cycle would emphasize training for good factory housekeeping. Other possible forms of training would center on the best use of tools, and procedures that would minimize the acceleration of the hazard buildup. Workers should learn to recognize the buildup cycle, and to spontaneously intervene by reorganizing their work spaces for a safer outcome (Viscusi 2000). The intervention essentially kick-starts a self-organization process for all workers. Entropy, having increased unto chaos, now causes the system to self-organize into a state where there is less internal entropy, and a more controlled transferral of energy into the work environment.
The concept of electrical safety climate was first expressed by Zohar (1980 cited Patterson 1999), who was investigating the safety practices, and workers’ views of those safety practices, that distinguished factories with good safety performance from those with poor performance. Attitudes toward the organization’s safety program and its effectiveness, worker training, availability of needed tools and personal protection equipment, and the foreman’s attentiveness to rule violations, all served to distinguish high and low performing groups (Viscusi 2000). The set of survey questions, taken together denoted a climate for safety.
The concept of climate was similar in principle to the organizational climate concepts, except that climate was viewed with respect to a more limited set of objectives or issues. The introduction of an organizational construct was justified because the measurements distinguished organizations rather than individuals (Patterson 1999).
Electrical workers and inspectors operate with a variety of notions of compliance. Full compliance is a standard set of conditions which they are aiming towards: this will usually be at least the legal or administrative definition of compliance, and it may represent a standard above the legal minimum. Inspectors may also operate with temporary definitions of compliance, that is a state of affairs which is less than full compliance but which is tolerated for a fixed period, until such time as they consider it reasonable for a state of full compliance to have been achieved (Cadick et al 2005).
Both of these are positive definitions, to the extent that they emphasize the degree to which something measures up to the required standard. When inspectors are wanting to emphasize the negative aspects of a situation they talked in terms of non-compliance. The definition, achievement, and maintenance of compliance is a process which continues for as long as a business is in operation and known about by the regulatory authorities. But while the activities regulated by inspectors are continuous, inspectors’ visits to these sites are ‘momentary’ and sometimes infrequent (Patterson 1999).
They therefore make decisions from ‘snapshots’ of activity, and with the benefit of varying levels of training, guidance, and experience. Issues of compliance therefore emerge in different contexts and settings and the meanings they take on are molded accordingly. It may take inspectors a long time to become familiar with some very large and complex organizations, a task which may be made more difficult by reorganizations.
For instance, British Railways is perhaps a good example, since its national organization was differentiated both on a regional basis and according to specialisms such as civil engineering, mechanical and electrical engineering, signals and telecommunications, and operations (Patterson 1999). Not only was this a complicated organization in itself but it was not a static organization. Each of the parts might be reorganized, leaving members of the RI with the problem of not knowing whom to contact, especially if jobs were awkwardly defined. However, some inspectors felt that reorganizations could help them if individual managers became responsible for larger areas, as inspectors would then need to contact fewer managers to effect improvements across a greater area.
In industrial settings, the environmental hazard parameters can be thought of as background and trigger variables, respectively. The relationship between hazards and accidents is thought to be linear in the sense of the Patterson (1999) hazard buildup process. Other evidence suggests that the electrical safety is actually a log-linear relationship, such that hazards are more closely related to the log of accidents rates, rather than to accident rates directly (Parkhurst and Niebur 2002).
Variables that represent sources of stress, which in turn affect performance, are thought to cause a sharp inflection of risk over a short amount of time when the background hazard level is sufficiently strong. Risk inflection, which is greatest when anxiety and stress are high, safety management is poor, and group size is small. Good safety management is thought to produce only a relatively low. Safety management is a control mechanism both in real circumstances and as a bifurcating effect in the model. Tests of the cusp model in two situations showed that the model provides a good description of the accident process and affords a variety of qualitative recommendations that an organization can use to enhance its safety performance (McCutchen 1999).
Conclusion
In sum, electricity is dangerous because it causes deaths and injuries if the workers are not protected and safety measures are not kept. Behavior modification programs, which selectively reward desired safety responses and censure undesirable behaviors, rank among the most effective means of controlling accidents, as long as the contingencies of reinforcement center on rewarding the desired behavior to a greater extent than on punishing undesirable behavior. Their chief limitations are, however, that they require constant monitoring by the agencies delivering the rewards, and only a narrow set of behaviors can be targeted effectively within a specific program. Also, they tend to view targeted behaviors in isolation, rather than as results of a complex system process. Sometimes those limitations are not problems, of course, but sometimes they are.
Bibliography
- Cadick, J., Capelli_M., Neitzel, D. K. Electrical Safety Handbook. McGraw-Hill Professional; 3 edition, 2005.
- McCutchen, D. Making Their Own Connections: Students’ Understanding of Multiple Models in Basic Electricity. Cognition and Instruction, 17, 1999. 249-259.
- Patterson, W. Transforming Electricity: The Coming Generation of Change. Earthscan Ltd, 1999.
- Parkhurst, D. J., Niebur, E., Variable-Resolution Displays: A Theoretical, Practical, and Behavioral Evaluation. Human Factors, 44, 2002, p. 611.
- Viscusi, K. Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act? Stanford Law Review, 52, 2000, pp. 547-597.