Guidici v. Guidici, 41 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1935)
Facts
The plaintiff was sixty years of age at the date of the execution of the said deed, and that he owned and resided upon a farm near Loyalton, Sierra County. He had purchased the farm in 1913, paying, therefore, the sum of $16,000. He owned no other property, except a small amount of stock maintained on his farm at the date he executed said deed, and said real property was the sole source of his livelihood and sole means whereby he contributed to the support of his three children. On the day the deed was executed, the plaintiff was driven in an automobile from his farm to Reno, Nevada for the purpose of the plaintiff and defendant being married in said city. On arriving at Reno, and after considerable delay, the four persons met in the office of a lawyer for the purpose of having said deed prepared and executed. They found, however, that they had no description of the property to be conveyed. The lawyer suggested that they get married and have the deed executed later. The defendant objected and refused to go on with the marriage ceremony until the deed was given. The party then returned to the plaintiff’s home for the purpose of getting a correct description of his land. The deed was dated November 12, 1930. This action was begun on February 14, 1931, soon after the plaintiff’s discharge from the hospital.
The plaintiff testified that he had been drinking excessively for ten days to two weeks prior to the date of said deed, and that he was so under the influence of intoxicating liquor that he had no recollection whatever of any of the occurrences which transpired on the trip to Reno, and no remembrance of signing or delivering said deed, or even of getting married to the defendant. That the plaintiff had indulged excessively in intoxicating liquor for some two weeks immediately prior to the date of the said deed is borne out by a number of witnesses.
Issue (law issue)
Plaintiff wants cancellation of deed because he said at the time of deed execution he was intoxicated due to heavy drinking and was not in his senses and was not aware of what he was doing. “This action was established by the plaintiff to terminate and set aside a deed to certain real property situated in Sierra County, executed by him in favor of the defendant, on the ground, as alleged in the complaint, ‘that at the time of the making of said deed the plaintiff, due to his age and due to the fact of his protracted and excessive drinking of alcoholic liquors… was entirely incapable of understanding his act in the execution of said deed, and was possessed of a great weakness of mind and was subject to the imposition and undue influence of defendant’. The court found this allegation of the complaint true, and further found that there was no consideration for the execution of said deed, and rendered judgment setting aside and canceling said deed. From this judgment the defendant has appealed, and in support of her appeal contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of the trial court.”
Rule
Cancellation of instruments (Deeds, consideration, marriage) by incompetent persons
“Though marriage is a good consideration for a deed, or for a contract generally, if such a deed is executed by the grantor at a time when he is incapable of understanding his actions in the execution thereof, by reason of long and excessive drinking, and the marriage is entered into about an hour later, while he is in the same state of mind, it cannot be said that the marriage ceremony forms a valid consideration for the execution of said deed.” (Relief in equity from deed on ground of intoxication, notes, 6 A. L. R. 334; 36 A. L. R)
Application
Element issue: whether the plaintiff executed deed in normal condition or was he intoxicated at the time of deed execution. He has the right to cancel the deed if he was intoxicated and does not remember deed execution.
Legal reasoning method – using a definition:
In this action to cancel a deed to real property, the evidence that the plaintiff at the time of signing the deed was in such a state of mind, due to long and excessive drinking of intoxicating liquor, that he did not know what he was doing, and that he had no recollection of signing the deed, was sufficient to support the finding that he was mentally incapable, at that time, of understanding the nature of his act in the signing and execution of said deed, and such finding could not be disturbed on appeal even though there was considerable conflict in the evidence.
Comparing the definition of the element to the facts:
Several witnesses including the plaintiff’s neighbor, cashier of the bank and his daughter all testified that the plaintiff was over drunk for 2 weeks. Doctor at hospital gave his opinion that the plaintiff was at that time “wholly incapable of doing any business”. Dr. Lavery, who attended the plaintiff at the hospital during his sickness in January, 1931.
Result of the comparison:
Hence the deed executed during his ill health and intoxication will not be considered as valid.
Conclusion (to the law issue)
“The rule that the person alleging his incapacity should be bound by his contract because intoxication is his voluntary act was at first relaxed by allowing him to show that his condition was brought about by the other party. But a more rational view now prevails. The law now regards the fact of intoxication and not the cause of it, and regards that fact as affording proof of want of mental capacity. A completely intoxicated person is generally placed on the same footing as persons of unsound mind. One deprived of reason and understanding by reason of drunkenness is, for the time, as unable to consent to the terms of a contract as are persons who lack mental capacity by reason of insanity or idiocy. A person who at the time of making a contract is completely intoxicated may avoid his contract notwithstanding the fact that his intoxicated condition may have been caused by his voluntary act and not by the contrivance of the other party to the contract….” (6 Ruling Case Law, p. 595.)
Donnelly v. Rees, 74 P. 433 (Cal. 1903)
Facts
“On the 15th, November, 1897, Patrick H. Kean was the owner of the half interest in the mining claims described and referred to in the complaint, the defendants fraudulently, and without any consideration, and by arts and importunities and by greater force of character and ascendency over the mind of said Patrick H. Kean, procured from him the deed of conveyance and transfer to them set out and described in the complaint, which deed was made while the said Kean was in a condition of intoxication and drunken imbecility and very weak in mind from the effects of the excessive drinking of intoxicating liquors to such an extent as to render him unfit to transact business and entirely incapable of properly realizing and understanding or attending to the said transaction. And for more than five years immediately before the making of said deed, the said Kean had been and was a habitual drunkard and constantly under the influence of the excessive drinking of intoxicating liquors, which were injurious to his mind so as to make him an easy prey to the arts and schemes of the defendants, which they exercised over him to induce him to execute said deed, and but for which he would not have done it.”
Issue (law issue)
Appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff and from an order denying the defendants’ motion for a new trial. The plaintiff is the daughter and sole heir of Patrick Kean, and brings this suit to set aside, as fraudulently obtained, a deed made by her father to the defendant–of date November 15, 1897. The land conveyed was an undivided half of certain mines owned by the former, and, it is found, was of the value of ten thousand dollars.
Rule
An action may be maintained by the sole heir of a deceased person to set aside a deed procured from the deceased without consideration by the fraudulent practices of the defendants and their undue influence over the deceased, who was known to be an habitual drunkard for more than five years before the execution of the deed, to an extent seriously to impair his mind, and who was so intoxicated at the time as to render him unfit to transact business, and entirely incapable of realizing, understanding, or attending to the transaction.
Application
Element issue: Whoever tries to grasp deed via fraudulent means will not be granted that deed.
Legal reasoning method – using a definition:
The defendants’ account of the matter is somewhat different, but in view of the findings of the court need not be considered. The same observation is true of Kean’s own declaration made in an affidavit in the Monaghan case, to the effect that the deed was not sham, or without consideration, or in fraud of creditors. This was admissible in evidence (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1853), and if the facts had been doubtful, would have been cogent in its effect; but it was not conclusive on the court. It may be observed that this affidavit, which was made in the presence of the defendants, alludes to a “contemporaneous writing executed by” them, of which they say nothing in their testimony; which is a significant circumstance. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1963, subd. 5.) On the facts found, the case comes within several of the provisions of section 2224 of the Civil Code, which, in view of other questions involved in the case, it may be important to distinguish: (1) The defendants gained the land by “fraud” –i. e. by actual fraud,–and also (2) by “undue influence,” and are therefore–or, rather, each is “an involuntary trustee of the thing gained”; and (3) the same result follows, because they gained the thing by “the violation of a trust.” Upon either of these principles, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, unless precluded–as is contended by the appellants –by the fact appearing from the testimony of Carroll, that the deed was made to defraud a creditor; with reference to which contention it is important to observe that the ground of relief under the first and second of the principles referred to is fraud and undue influence in procuring the original conveyance (Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. 527 [FN1]); while under the third there is no fraud in the procurement of the instrument, but the fraud is one of those consisting “in the fraudulent use of instruments entered into upon a mutual confidence of the parties,” or, in other words, in violation of the trust voluntarily assumed in accepting the instrument.
Comparing the definition of the element to the facts:
Counsel for the respondent “do not deny the general rule that a court of equity will not grant relief to the person who has made a deed to [defraud] creditors,” and, for the purposes of the decision, this will be assumed to be the law; but their position is, that the rule has no application to a case like the present, where the deed was procured by undue influence or fraud of the defendants; and in this contention I think they are sustained by the authorities cited by them and by others.
Result of the comparison:
Kean did not rescind promptly, and that it was error to allow testimony as to the habits and condition of Kean at periods from seventeen to twelve years prior to the date of the transaction. But the last objection affects rather the weight than the admissibility of the testimony (Code Civ. Proc., secs. 1832, 1957, 1960, subd. 2); and the former contention is also untenable. (More v. More, 133 Cal. 489; Field v. Austin, 131 Cal. 379; Civ. Code, secs. 3406 et seq.) It was not necessary that the plaintiff should pay to the defendants the amount of their alleged bill, or to O’Brien the amounts alleged to have been advanced to Kean subsequently to the transaction; or that the court should so adjudge under the findings–which we have held to be sustained by the evidence. These matters cannot be regarded as being connected with the transaction.
Conclusion (to the law issue)
After taking into consideration all satisfactory reasons the case here comes clearly within the last, which is the narrowest, of the grounds assigned for the rule. It may be added that the principle applies a fortiori in this case, where, by express statutory provisions containing no qualifying or excepting words, “one who gains a thing by fraud… [or] undue influence” takes as trustee for the grantor. (Civ. Code, sec. 2224)
Marron v. Maron, 125 P. 914 (Cal. App. 1912)
Facts
On April 22, 1907, in consideration of the sum of $10, the deceased made a deed and assignment to his mother of property estimated to be of the value of about $15,000, and being nearly all of his real and personal property. He was then about thirty-three years of age. “He was fragile and a man of very nervous temperament”; was married and had a child, a girl, about four months old. At the time of his marriage in February, 1901, he was accustomed to drinking occasionally intoxicating liquor, and in the spring of the following year commenced to drink such liquor to excess, and continued to do so until the time of his death. On the day he made the deed and assignment he was drunk, stupid and appeared irrational. “He was not in his right mind and he didn’t know what he was doing.” His mother and other members of her family were probably present when he executed the instruments, but his wife, whom he held in high regard, was absent and knew nothing about the transaction until several days afterward. The notary before whom the acknowledgment was made, believing that the deceased was conveying his property to his wife, explained to him that “under the instrument his wife could sell the property if she wanted to,” and he made a note of such explanation in his official record.
Issue (law issue)
About three months thereafter he died, and subsequently the plaintiff, his wife, was appointed the administratrix of his estate, whereupon she brought this action to set aside the deed and bill of sale to said properties, upon the grounds that Thomas F. Marron was of unsound mind at the time the instruments of conveyance were executed; that they were procured from him by undue influence and by fraud practiced upon him by the defendant Mary Marron.
This is an appeal from a judgment following the granting of a motion for nonsuit in an action brought by the plaintiff to set aside a transfer of real and personal property. On and prior to the twenty-second day of April, 1907, Thomas F. Marron was the owner of certain pieces of real property situated in the city and county of San Francisco. He was married and had one child, aged four months. On the abovementioned date he made a deed and an assignment, purporting to convey to Mary Marron, one of the defendants, the real and personal property described in the complaint.
Rule
In an action by the wife of a deceased husband, as administratrix of his estate, to set aside a deed made to his mother of nearly all of his real and personal property of the value of $15,000, for a nominal consideration of $10, alleged to have been procured from him by his mother while he was mentally incompetent, by means of fraud and undue influence, to the exclusion of his wife and infant child, whom he loved, it is held that the evidence was such as to throw upon the mother the burden of proof to show that the deed was not so obtained, and that it was error to nonsuit the plaintiff.
Application
After the plaintiff had closed her case, the court granted a motion for nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff evidence failed to show that, at the time of making the instruments, the deceased was incompetent or that the execution of those documents was the result of fraud or undue influence exercised upon him as charged in the complaint. Upon this order judgment was regularly entered. Plaintiff excepted to the ruling granting the motion, and now assigns that ruling as error. We think the ruling cannot be sustained.
The evidence shows that the deceased for a number of years was continually becoming intoxicated. He was drunk and appeared stupid and irrational on April 22d; and yet on that day and in that condition his mother accepted the instruments in question, transferring substantially all of his property to her, and, according to a fair inference from the testimony, without any, or if any, a totally inadequate, consideration. This left him and his wife and baby, to whom he was fondly attached, with so small a portion of his property that his act may be regarded as an unusual one and one inconsistent with his duties and obligations to his wife and child as well as to himself.
Generally, when there is weakness of mind in a person executing a conveyance of land, arising from age, sickness, intoxication or any other cause, although not amounting to absolute disqualification, and inadequate consideration, imposition or undue influence will be presumed.
For the reasons above indicated we think the trial court erred in granting the motion for nonsuit. The judgment is therefore reversed.
Conclusion (to the law issue)
The circumstances under which a conveyance was made, the condition of the grantor at the time, and the injustice to him and his heirs if it is upheld, may cast on the grantee the burden of showing the absence of undue influence or imposition. (Bennett v.Bennett, 65 Neb. 432, [91 N. W. 409, 96 N. W. 994].)
Swan v. Talbot, 94 P. 238 (Cal. 1907)
Facts
In his petition for a rehearing appellant, with other matters, presses upon the attention of the court the fact that in the judgment given against him he is charged with the sum of $2,591.96, being the amount of a note for two thousand dollars, with interest, executed by one Anderson to plaintiff and by plaintiff deposited as collateral security for his indebtedness to the bank, the payment of which indebtedness defendant had assumed. Petitioner, moreover, shows that there is a direct conflict in the evidence between Swan, the payee, and Anderson, the maker of the note, Swan testifying that it was a note given by Anderson in payment of moneys which plaintiff had from time to time loaned to him, Anderson testifying that it was a mere accommodation note given to Swan to assist him in borrowing money. There is no evidence touching the responsibility of the maker of the note, nor of its value. Under these circumstances, it was inequitable to charge Talbot with the amount of the note and accrued interest. The judgment against Talbot should therefore be modified by subtracting therefrom the amount of the Anderson note with accrued interest.
Issue (law issue)
Plaintiff sued for the cancellation and rescission of a bill of sale which he had executed to defendant, and under which defendant had taken possession of the personal property therein described. He prayed that he be restored to the possession of the property and in case possession could not be had, be compensated for the value of the property withheld.
Rule
The judgment heretofore given by this court is set aside, and the following judgment given: “It is ordered that the court below modify the judgment heretofore given by subtracting from the judgment against Talbot the amount of the Anderson note with accrued interest, and that when so modified, the judgment shall stand affirmed. The order denying a new trial is affirmed. Appellant shall recover his costs on this appeal.”
Application
The ground of action was that defendant had knowingly taken advantage of plaintiff while the latter was so intoxicated as to be incapable of transacting business, and, under these circumstances, secured his signature to the instrument. It was alleged that the property conveyed was of great value, and that the consideration for the bill of sale was grossly inadequate. The cause was tried before the court without a jury, and the court found the incompetency and incapacity of the plaintiff because of his drunkenness, and found that the property which Swan conveyed to Talbot was of the value of $21,949.86, while the total amount due from Swan to Talbot, including two hundred dollars in coin paid to Swan at the time of the execution of the bill of sale, was but $10,604.32. The court found, moreover, that owing to changes of ownership in the personal property it was impracticable, while decreeing a cancellation of the bill of sale, to further order the restoration of the personal property, and therefore proceeded to give judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $11,345.54, being the difference between the amount of Swan’s indebtedness to Talbot and the value of the property which Talbot obtained under the bill of sale. From this judgment and from the order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial he prosecutes this appeal.
It is contended that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of the plaintiff’s legal incapacity by reason of intoxication. By plaintiff it was shown that he was, and for years had been, a tenant of defendant, farming parts of defendant’s lands on shares, and that he had accumulated personal property, farming utensils, stock, interest in growing crops and the like of great value. He was married, and with his wife lived upon one of defendant’s ranches. He discovered that his wife was illicitly intimate with defendant, and upon the discovery went to the neighboring town of Willows and undertook to drink away his sorrow. His drinking led to a protracted debauch, lasting several days. Upon the day that the bill of sale was executed, and before its execution, he was so drunk, according to the testimony of several witnesses, that he fell on the streets and had to be helped upstairs, and three hours after the execution of the instrument he was so drunk that he collapsed and was put to bed. He recollected nothing of the transaction. There was thus certainly sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding of the court.
The action is in form of a simple action for a rescission of the bill of sale and the restoration to the plaintiff of the property of which defendant took possession under the instrument. As has been said, the court found for a rescission of the instrument, but found also that it was impracticable to decree a restoration and return of the property, and it proceeded thereupon to state and settle an account between the parties.
Conclusion (to the law issue)
“It is no objection to the relief which is thus decreed in an equitable action that the court should finally determine that the necessary and appropriate remedy should take the form of a personal monetary judgment. The court in this case was therefore justified in determining the value of the properties conveyed by Swan, the amount of Swan’s indebtedness to Talbot, and in decreeing a personal judgment for the difference.” For these reasons the judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.
Phelan v. Gardner, 43 Cal. 306 (1872)
Facts
The defendant employed the plaintiff as his broker, to sell for him certain land at an agreed commission of five per cent on the amount of the sale. The plaintiff procured and brought to the defendant one Cusheon, who agreed with the defendant, verbally, to purchase the land for the sum of thirty thousand dollars. The defendant gave Cusheon a memorandum in writing, by which he promised to sell to him for the price named, and to give him fifteen days to complete the search and purchase of the land. Before the expiration of the fifteen days, Cusheon tendered to the defendant a performance in accordance with the agreement, and was informed that the land had been sold to another party. The plaintiff brings suit to recover the amount of his commissions. It is not contended upon either part that there was a valid and binding contract of sale between Cusheon and the defendant. The defendant claims that for this reason the plaintiff’s commission was not earned. This theory is untenable. The plaintiff could do no more than procure a purchaser who was acceptable to the defendant, and willing and able to purchase the land upon terms satisfactory to him. He could not control the will of the defendant or force him to make a binding contract with the purchaser, or prevent him from selling to another. In the absence of an agreement to that effect, the principal cannot refuse to pay the broker’s commissions upon the ground that he did not choose to make the sale. He cannot avoid the contract by his voluntary act disabling himself from performance.
Issue (law issue)
It was competent for the plaintiff to rebut defendant’s evidence of the settlement and receipt by proof that at the time of the transaction the plaintiff was incapable of contracting intelligently by reason of intoxication. The proof upon this point was conflicting. There was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was intoxicated when he signed the receipt, and other evidence to the effect that he was then sober, but that the completion of the business was followed by a protracted carouse. The Court permitted the plaintiff’s wife to testify that he was brought to his home by the defendant and another person several hours after the time when the receipt was shown to have been signed, and in a state of thorough intoxication. The fact to be arrived at was the mental condition of the plaintiff at the time the business was transacted. We cannot say that under the circumstances of the case the Court erred in holding that his condition a few hours later in the same evening would throw some light upon the question under consideration.
Rule
The judgment roll in the action of forcible entry and detainer was properly excluded.
The issue in that case was whether a certain sum of money had been paid by the defendant and received by plaintiff in satisfaction, discharge, and settlement of the cause of action involved in that suit. It was alleged in the answer in that case, and found by the Court, that the money was paid and received in discharge and settlement of this present action as well as of the one then pending. But this was a finding without the issues made, and unnecessary in the decision of that case. It was not necessary that the court should find that the payment to plaintiff was made and received in satisfaction, discharge, and settlement of every claim, debt, or cause of action,” but only of the cause of action then under consideration. At most, the fact of the settlement of this case could be only incidentally in controversy in the County Court. which might have been litigated and decided in the suit. Judgment and order affirmed
Application
The Court erred in refusing to admit in evidence the judgment roll in the forcible entry and detainer action. The claim of plaintiff in this action, and the action itself, could be settled by agreement between the parties, by payment of a less sum than that claimed by plaintiff, it not being a liquidated debt. Cases there cited, by editor in the notes to sixth American edition. The settlement pleaded by the defendant in this action is shown by the judgment roll offered in evidence to have been adjudicated between the same parties in another action, so that it was res judicata at the time of the trial in this action. The judgment being pleaded as estoppel, the judgment roll should have been admitted, and the jury instructed, that by the judgment the plaintiff was estopped to deny the settlement alleged in the answer.
The evidence in said action is insufficient to sustain the verdict, in that it fails to show that plaintiff ever became entitled to the commissions for which he sues. The defendant did not give to plaintiff the exclusive right to sell the land. Not having done so, defendant had the right to sell the land at any time before the plaintiff should bring to him a purchaser able and willing then and there to buy the land on the terms proposed.
When plaintiff brought Cusheon to defendant, as a purchaser, nothing further was done than for the defendant to give Cusheon, without consideration, a promise that he should have fifteen days to complete his search and purchase at a price certain. The defendant had the right, at any time before the bargain was closed, to recall his offer and sell to another.
Conclusion (to the law issue)
Upon these undisputed facts the defendant owed the plaintiff the precise liquidated sum of one thousand five hundred dollars according to the authorities cited by the defendant’s counsel in his brief, and the case in this Court of Middleton v. Findla, 25 Cal. 76, and Blood v. Shannon, 29 Cal. 359.
There was no error in excluding the judgment roll in the County Court.
Similarities and Differences among the cases
One similarity in all the cases is that they are related with overdrinking and intoxication that resulted in loss of intellect and wise thinking. The defendant took the advantage of the plaintiff’s ill-health, overconsumption of alcohol and intoxication and got signed the deed, bill and any other property related papers that executed the deal.
In Guidici v. Guidici, 41 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1935) the defendant got the deed signed by the plaintiff when he was intoxicated with over consumption of alcohol and was not in his normal state to conduct any business dealings. In same intoxication condition she got married to the plaintiff to obtain the deed.
In Donnelly v. Rees, 74 P. 433 (Cal. 1903) the sole heir and daughter of the deceased Patrick Kean sued the defendant for getting signed in the deed from his father when he was over drunk and intoxicated due to heavy consumption of alcohol. The portion of land that was given to the defendant while he was not normal and competent to do any business, and the portion of the mines were an undivided half owned by her father.
In Marron v. Maron, 125 P. 914 (Cal. App. 1912) the plaintiff sued mother of her husband for fraudulently getting her husband’s property transferred to her in the state of intoxication. When her husband was heavily drunk and not in his normal state of mind, his mother and family got him signed the deed of his property.
In Swan v. Talbot, 94 P. 238 (Cal. 1907) the defended took advantage of plaintiff’s intoxication and over consumption of alcohol and got the bill of sale of his property signed from him at much lower the cost of its original value to get his property. However, after recovering plaintiff sued defendant for fraudulently getting his property at much lower price when he was not in his senses and drunken.
In Phelan v. Gardner, 43 Cal. 306 (1872) plaintiff is a broker who filed a case against defendant, a property owner, that he found a buyer for him and he must pay off his commission. However, defendant’s claim that he found another buyer and took 15 days period to search of his own. Meanwhile defendant found another buyer and he sold off the property to someone else. The case was ruled in favor of defendant that he’s the owner and can sell his property to anyone he wishes.
References
- Guidici v. Guidici, 41 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1935)
- Donnelly v. Rees, 74 P. 433 (Cal. 1903)
- Marron v. Maron, 125 P. 914 (Cal. App. 1912)
- Swan v. Talbot, 94 P. 238 (Cal. 1907)
- Phelan v. Gardner, 43 Cal. 306 (1872)