Introduction
Critical infrastructure refers to a cluster of essential networks and resources that determines a country’s stability and overall performance. There exist 16 vital infrastructures, including but not limited to the communication, defense, and transportation sectors (Almaleh & Tipper, 2021). This paper focuses on the communication sector, which comprises three main sub-facets, namely, communication in healthcare facilities, energy, and emergency services providers. The three sub-categories had not been discussed in my previous meeting with River and will, therefore, be highlighted in this literature. The hypothetical threats in the three aforementioned sub-facets will be discussed under physical attack, cyber event and natural disaster respectively, thus forming the basis of this paper.
Physical Attack
Description of Hypothetical Threat (Health Services Provision)
Biological weapons fashioned against a given country constitute a hypothetical physical threat that can affect the healthcare sector. Terrorist groups and other countries with malicious intentions may create biological weapons and use them against another country through practices like agroterrorism (Almaleh & Tipper, 2021). Whereas those who are seriously affected by hazardous bioagents may eventually die, infected victims would inflict unprecedented strain on the country’s health facilities. The section below highlights how healthcare provision relates to national security.
Background on Critical Infrastructure as it Relates to National Security
Both public and privatized healthcare systems have a tangential relationship to national security. For instance, the sector was charged with the responsibility of devising responses when the Covid-19 epidemic took its toll globally to avert the national safety threat (Almaleh & Tipper, 2021). This was accomplished through the conduct of several clinical and randomized trials, which involved testing of various preventive medications and potential vaccines.
Risks from the Hypothetical Threat
Firstly, the threat of the physical impact from biological chemicals spreading across the nation creates a significant healthcare burden, an economic disequilibrium and the advent of genetic complications. For example, the Rajneeshee bioterror attack in 1984 left over 700 victims suffering from food poisoning when salmonella enterica was deliberately introduced into food salads (Biasin, 2020). Secondly, biological attacks could disrupt normal food supplies, causing unprecedented scarcities and starvation in extreme cases.
How Damage Affects the Dependencies Between Critical Infrastructure Sectors
The healthcare industry and other critical infrastructures are interlinked in various ways. For instance, the energy sector provides the power to medical institutions that run sophisticated scanning and treatment devices. The healthcare niche further depends on the emergency services sector for prompt services such as fire extinguishing and rescue team support. The aforementioned interconnections would be at risk in the event of a biological attack since staff movement would be hampered. Additionally, such attacks typically shift each sector’s attention to focus on mitigating the threat internally, thus affecting conventional interdependence.
Existing Resiliency Related to Continuity of Operations
By reducing the risks and exploitable vulnerabilities, the healthcare sector portrays resilience related to its continuity. This is achieved by the pharmaceutical sector developing different treatment options and vaccines over time. To preserve the lives of the populace, the sector is working on solutions that will aid in controlling the spread of diseases and provide ethical public protocols to be followed during pandemics. Similarly, by redefining conventional health safety precautions, it is possible to minimize delays while improving the safety of first responders. Infected persons can receive protocols from the public health sector that are intended to prevent the transmission of infections.
First responders, on the other hand, are obliged to follow these measures if they volunteer to assist patients in emergency cases to guarantee their safety. The section below elaborates on how a different critical infrastructure (the energy supply docket) can be affected by cyber-attacks.
Cyber Event
Description of a Hypothetical Threat (The Energy Sector)
In any given nation, different industries rely predominantly on the energy sector. The latter provides vital fuel required to guarantee that production, manufacturing, and processing cycles in industries run smoothly. Domestically, natural gas is used for cooking, water heating and air conditioning. In commercial hubs, organizations require electricity to operate computers and other digital accessories. However, despite these diversified access channels, it has been established that security has not been not prioritized when developing the energy protocols and networks for power grids.
Nevertheless, these systems continue to be utilized alongside contemporary technology and are becoming more open to external access via the Internet. Most electricity suppliers lack adequate defense mechanisms at different Purdue Architecture Tiers, making them utterly vulnerable to cyberattacks because of the network’s connectivity to the Internet (Beresneva & Pyatkova, 2019). Attackers may meddle with the existing security zones by exploring glitches in trusted connections and cause prolonged outages. This would have an impact on the distribution, transmission, and other customer-oriented services related to energy supply.
Risks from the Hypothetical Threat
The likelihood of a cyberattack on the energy industry is extremely high. Attacks on the electrical infrastructure can have a significant effect on the daily life of citizens and corporate activities. Firstly, a prolonged power outage in the affected area would make it difficult to complete various household chores. Secondly, subsequent breaches into other sectors dependent on the compromised electrical grid may result from the vulnerabilities created by large-scale attacks. Since their systems might have been active when the attack began, hackers are more likely to capitalize on such vulnerabilities to perpetuate their motives.
How Damage Affects the Interdependencies Between Critical Infrastructure Sectors
The damage from the hypothetical threat (cyberattack) affects interdependencies for nearly all of the other 16 critical infrastructure sectors, particularly for the industries located where the breach occurred. Since every sector needs energy to run, the shutdown of power hampers the advancements of industrial processes and logistics coordination. Although generators might be used to restore normal operations, their inclusion only mitigates the threat to a limited extent.
Existing Resiliency Related to Continuity of Operations
The redefined plans for risk/threat mitigation contribute to the energy sector’s resilience concerning the continuation of operations. The increased cybersecurity measures enforced to buffer cyber threats would help curb continuous breaches. Resilience has been provided with the inclusion of additional energy-supply alternatives such as generators and solar panels. Consequently, updating obsolete power grids and other energy transmission networks is tailored towards minimizing vulnerabilities and threats.
On the other hand, there are several ways to show that mitigating power interactions would benefit the first responders. By improving technology and pioneering the use of environmentally friendly batteries in emergencies, the energy sector will ensure that individuals in need of assistance are assessed on time (Åžener, 2019). Maintaining the connection between emergency calls uninterrupted significantly ameliorates the collateral damage brought by such attacks. Emergencies will be less disruptive thanks to this sector providing first responders with a wider range of energy sources. The segment below illustrates the effects of natural disasters on the emergency services sector.
Natural Disaster Related
Description of a Hypothetical Threat (Emergency Services Sector)
The emergency services industry is continually challenged by the hypothetical threat of natural disasters. For instance, a category four storm in the tristate zone—an area between New Jersey, Connecticut, and New York—would constitute a natural disaster. This hurricane’s size causes massive flooding that severely affects a population of 19 million inhabitants (Böröcz, 2021). The hurricane’s strong winds damage utility connections, thus compromising the power supply. Whether this hypothetical scenario occurs, the emergency services sector finds it difficult to leverage communications links to save the victims.
Background on Critical Infrastructure as it Relates to National Security
The emergency services industry has a direct impact on a nation’s security. This sector, which comprises emergency medical services, fire and rescue services, and law enforcement organizations, is responsible for guaranteeing the public’s safety and protection during crises. For instance, law enforcement personnel foster peaceful existence within their jurisprudential framework. These officers enhance national security by arresting potential crime perpetrators and alibis and charging those convicted guilty.
Risks from the Hypothetical Threat
Given the unpredictable nature of weather, there is a very high possibility that natural disasters will affect the emergency services industry. For instance, the potential threat of a category four hurricane would devastate this industry, especially given that it is in charge of handling emergencies triggered by such natural hazards. The hazards from such threats include impassable roadways, vandalized cell booster towers, flooded emergency routes, and live electrical wires on the ground that could induce deaths by electric shocks. These challenges hinder the performance and efficiency of the entire sector.
How Damage Affects the Dependencies Between Critical Infrastructure Sectors
Whereas the communication sector provides networks via which information is accessible, the energy and transportation industries deliver supplies and emergency personnel to those involved in crises. Collectively, the impassable roadways and flooded emergency routes hamper all the forecited sectors from supporting efforts by the emergency department to address crises. This is because natural calamities cripple the mobility of resources and experts to and from affected areas, making it extremely difficult to rescue victims and recover valuable resources in time.
Existing Resiliency Related to Continuity of Operations
The most important aspects in ensuring that every area of this sector is robust is training emergency personnel and raising public awareness. These two methods avail information about emergencies that may help thwart threats and improve preparedness if they occur. Concurrently, the number of negative outcomes would be decreased if first responders had the relevant training on how to handle each kind of emergency (Blanco-Medina et al., 2021). It is essential that first responders first map out a probable course of action while evaluating emergencies. This guarantees both their safety and that of the victims.
Conclusion
Critical infrastructure refers to networks and resources that determine a country’s stability. The communication sector encompasses sub-sectors such as healthcare facilities, energy, and emergency services providers. However, these entities face different physical, cyber and naturally occurring threats, as discussed throughout this literature. The study of vulnerabilities in different sectors highlighted in this paper can be used by readers to formulate policies that buffer the impacts of such risks.
References
Almaleh, A., & Tipper, D. (2021). Risk-based criticality assessment for smart critical infrastructures. Infrastructures, 7(1), 3. Web.
Beresneva, N., & Pyatkova, N. (2019). The approach to determining vulnerable elements in critical energy infrastructures. In E3S Web of Conferences (Vol. 139, p. 01017). EDP Sciences.
Biasin, E. (2020). Healthcare critical infrastructures protection and cybersecurity in the EU: regulatory challenges and opportunities. In Proceedings of the 1st European Cluster for Securing Critical Infrastructures (ECSCI) Virtual Workshop. Web.
Böröcz, M. (2021). Critical infrastructure protection policy in the EU. Strategic Impact, 80(3), 46-61. Web.
Blanco-Medina, P., Fidalgo, E., Alegre, E., Vasco-Carofilis, R. A., Jañez-Martino, F., & Villar, V. F. (2021). Detecting vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures by classifying exposed industrial control systems using deep learning. Applied Sciences, 11(1), 367. Web.
Åžener, M. (2019). Economic impact of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructures. In Applying Methods of Scientific Inquiry into Intelligence, Security, and Counterterrorism (pp. 291-314). IGI Global. Web.