Park Chung Hee, having resigned from the army, ran for office in the October presidential election and won. In the November National Assembly elections, candidates from Park’s Democratic Republican Party won an impressive victory, forming a stable majority force.1 On December 17, 1963, Park was inaugurated as the president of the Republic of Korea. In his inauguration speech, he emphasized, “with the tremendous task of modernization before us, we stand to choose between quarrels, political fights and division, and sliding back, and amity, cooperation, unity and national common interest”2.
The election in October 1963 converted Gen. Park’s military rule into a civilian one, although he carried only 45% of the electorate and a plurality of less than 200,000 votes.3 This less than resounding start for his civilian rule was a thin basis for restructuring the government, and Park had to assume the unfamiliar role of a politician, rather than meeting the clearer requirements of a military commander. Park’s disdain for politicians and political dealings was well known, but he was able to make the transition to the political arena a relatively smooth one, without rancor and without losing his hardworking, capable, and, above all, completely loyal supporters.
Unlike when he seized power in 1961, Park no longer had to rely on military members of the SCNR, as well as advisors outside the military, for advice and support. With the inauguration of his civilian administration in 1963, the bureaucracy was under the control of carefully selected cabinet officials who provided the independent expertise required to enable the government to function efficiently without challenge to the leadership at the top.
The earlier relationship of the SCNR, the cabinet, and the KCIA was revised, and the three central power elements that emerged within the Korean government as the focal point for most policy and power decisions were the cabinet, Park’s advisors in the “Blue House,” and the KCIA. Although Park retained the power to make the crucial decisions that shaped the policy and direction of the Korean state, all three of these groups had a direct input in the formulation of policy and participated fully in translating policy decisions into political and governmental actions. The members of the cabinet had a good deal of decision-making power, and, as long as they remained loyal to Park and devoted to their assignments, they were consistently backed.4
This practice of political patronage resulted in a stable cabinet that raised few problems in Park’s inner circle of close associates and advisors. Dissention, while tolerated in limited amounts, was closely controlled, and all those within the government bureaucracy were expected to keep in step and march steadily toward the president’s goals for the nation. To the West, the appearance of total governmental consensus looked like coercion, and lacked the strength of political and bureaucratic compromise so highly valued in Western democratic systems5.
Park, as part of his plan to modernize the country, concentrated power in his presidential secretariat and the cabinet.6 Further, Park distrusted political parties and politicians, and he kept them at arm’s length, away from the real center of power in the government, and prevented them from ever becoming a primary source of influence. Although political parties and politicians forced Park to take into account popular concerns and social pressures, they had little meaningful influence.
With the National Assembly and DRP effectively discounted, and the KCIA and the Blue House advisors shut away from public scrutiny, any analysis of the characteristics of Park’s post-junta government is necessarily confined to an evaluation of data on cabinet-level officials. By studying the demographic profiles of the men who held positions in Park’s various cabinets, and by collating these data according to the nature of the positions these men received and the duration of their appointments, it is possible to identify characteristic attitudes, biases, and perceptions that belong to Park.
The demographic backgrounds of the men at the policy making level of the Korean government indicate the limited flexibility of Park’s regime and the inability of different segments within the government to impede or review the president’s decisions. Those who shared Park’s environment or had a background similar to his held their positions longer than others and enjoyed a greater influence on the president, as well as his confidence in their loyalty. These men had the president’s general support for their own policy decisions and were able to influence his thinking before decisions were made. Because of the intensely personal manner with which President Park administered the state, several salient factors in the backgrounds of Korean cabinet members stand out as important.7
Contradicting an earlier alienation of intellectuals, the cabinet selections made from 1966 to 1969 show an effort by Park to re-involve them in a higher level of governmental process. There is further evidence that, in spite of a bias against academics in favor of military men, highly educated officials were favored with longer terms in office. Park and his associates may have disliked the attitudes of the intellectuals, but the charge of “anti-intellectualism” so often leveled at the regime and its policies appears unfounded.
Although the term of office for officials with only a secondary school education seemed high (an average of 24.8 months), they comprised only 14% of the total appointments. On the other hand, those who attained only a junior college or, more significantly, only a military academy level education showed an average tenure in office of 15.8 months, which is shorter than that of those with 4 years of college education or above.8
Park’s record of economic development policies is impressive. Although this achievement was ultimately made by the millions of well-educated, disciplined, and hard-working Koreans, it was Park’s iron will and bureaucratic authoritarianism that provided a political basis for rapid industrialization. The government effectively used ambitious economic plans, exported stimulation methods, foreign capital, and technology. Park was dedicated to restoring a sense of national pride in the populace, and to do so, special emphasis under the Yushin educational system was given to the glorification of past Korean heroes.9
As part of the economic development plans of Park’s regime, the structure of the Korean economy was changed from traditional agriculture in the early of 1960s to that of industry in the late 1970s. Substantial successes were achieved under the first two 5-year economic development plans, covering 1962-1971.10
A new economic strategy, emphasizing diversification of production and trade, proved generally successful in the 1970s. The government made a bold move to expand heavy and chemical industries under the Third Plan (1972-1976), investing in the areas of steel, machinery, shipbuilding, electronics, chemicals, and nonferrous metals.11
The government of Korea in its support of private business went one step further than in Japan. It actively helped create large conglomerates, promoting mergers and directing entry and exit of firms, according to the requirements of technological-scale economies and world-demand conditions. The result was a manufacturing industry that displayed one of the highest levels of market concentration among developing or developed economies.12
One of the most impressive achievements was the construction of expressways. Following completion of the Seoul-Inchon Expressway there came the Seoul-Busan Superhighway with its 428 kilometers and 4 hours of driving time for there, the Ho-nam Expressway, the Yong-dong Expressway, the Nam-hae Expressway and all die others (Kil, 1972, p. 155).
To evaluate Park Chung Hee’s leadership, one has to see him from the various aspects of his character (Hurst & Lee, 1980). First, like so many others who came to power in a time of turmoil, Park obviously thought of himself as indispensable or irreplaceable, if not infallible. He believed that given his immense presidential responsibilities and cumulative experiences, he alone was uniquely capable of appreciating and realizing what was good for Korea’s future.
He was able to mobilize the common people behind him but not the intelligentsia. By the creation of massive campaigns, he did give people a sense of participation in the development of their country without surrendering any of his own governing power and cultivated a sense of mission and dedication to the nation.
J. N. Lee (1991) argues that Park Chung Hee was one political leader who made strong commitments. When Park started the military coup, he organized the council of the military revolution and utilized the six public pledges. First was the priority of national policy, which was anti-communist. Second was to observe the charter of the United Nations and the international agreements, and to strengthen the friendship with the United States and other western nations. Third was to purge all social corruption and old social evils, and to stimulate a new national spirit by inspiring patriotism and national ethics. Fourth was to concentrate on economic development for self-reliance and against poverty. Fifth was to exert all the efforts to achieve national unification. And sixth was an explicit statement on shifting to more democratic policies once the five goals were achieved.
Gong calls Park’s leadership “authoritarianism-capitalism nexus,”13 a form of leadership that suppressed human rights and rebel movements. However, according to Gong, Park’s use of an authoritarian form of government has enabled the people to escape serious poverty and led the country toward economic prosperity.
Along with this economic success, 1972 marked the beginning of the first dialogue with North Korea. That led to great hopes and almost a feeling of euphoria. Park, however, was fully aware of the dangers involved in dialogue and that the chances of any real success were indeed slim. Furthermore, there were numerous changes in international affairs affecting Korea, which added to the difficulty of the times.14
President Park was empowered to exercise emergency powers by the Yushin Constitution in order to further stabilize the political atmosphere and to insure that government did indeed serve the needs of the people, President Park ordered an all-out administrative reform in 1974 to wipe out all corruption and irregular practices from the government bureaucracy. He established a national security law to prohibit any preliminary plan, conspiracy, or action, which would jeopardize national security.
Park awakened the Korean people to the invariable contribution of the U.N. troops in Korea. Moreover, he was seriously concerned not only with social corruption, but also with the corruption of bureaucrats and politicians. In addition, Park cracked down on social evils such as smuggling, drugs, street gangs, and corrupted officials. As a result, the majority of the Korean people supported Park’s performance on his revolutionary commitment.15
After Park’s assassination by his intelligence director, there followed at least a decade of public discredit16, Slowly, however, his economic achievements, patriotism, frugal lifestyle, and strength of character have reasserted themselves in the public mind. Today in South Korea, Park is recognized and respected as his country’s most effective leader.
South Korea is full of monuments to Park Chung Hee, from the giant steel mills, shipyards, and factories he built to the superhighway system he launched. All are reminders of the man who, more than any other, made South Korea what it is today in economic terms.17
McFarland predicted that in the future, due to the continuously weakening, stagnant government, the Korean people will be unable to imagine a new kind of president for their nation. They are faced with an absence of alternatives and options and frighteningly, with no readily available choices, they are looking back to President Park Chung Hee, who dictated perhaps the most repressive regime in post-independent Korea, with a degree of longing.
This new deification of Park is the people’s answer to their search for a strong leader, a hero, and a role model. Through a combination of strong state and the development of heavy industry, he modernized Korea during his 18-year reign and astounded the world with its explosive entrance into the global economy. He defined and met the people’s needs beyond expectation, a feat that has not been repeated since and many feel not likely to again. Even presidential candidates have been caught capitalizing on the “Park Syndrome,” attempting to gain votes by competing to most resemble the past leader, some even changing their hairstyles to look physically more like Park.18
Park Chung Hee’s government gave priority to education, medical care, and other issues that affected the life of the people. He promulgated the Charter of National Education in December 1968. At a national conference of educational leaders in 1972, he put forth a grand proposition for “education with national identity.” It was his desire that schools promote the spirit of independence enabling the populace to join the struggle for national regeneration based on the ideals of traditional culture.19
President Park always exhibited a deep interest in the problems, concerns, and welfare of the working people, particularly low-income workers. To provide the workers the opportunity to achieve higher education, Park supported night schools provided by industries for young workers. On several occasions, he visited such schools to personally encourage the young worker-students. Improving living standards and ever-increasing job opportunities accelerated a desire for education, particularly for students who desired entrance secondary schools and institutions of higher learning.
In order to build a capable new generation, the government drew up a Charter of National Education, formulating an educational policy in compliance with its spirit. Traditionally, the Korean people have had a strong desire for learning, but Korean education in the past lacked objectives. It was not clear as to its purpose. The government, therefore, sponsored a study to establish clear-cut objectives, mobilizing experts in all fields. The result of the yearlong study was presented in the form of the Charter of National Education, designed to see that the rising generation should develop both creativity and a sense of cooperation.20
In addition to addressing education, Park also addressed the health-care system in Korea. Medical care has always been a luxury for the very poor. In January 1977, President Park introduced a medical care program for low-income workers and in July of that year a medical insurance system. In addition, in order to provide a healthy environment for the people, he called for a nationwide environmental protection campaign.
He expressed concern over environmental pollution and the destruction of nature resulting from the rapid industrialization of the nation. On October 5, 1978, he proclaimed the Charter for Nature Preservation through which every citizen was urged to pledge support for the protection of the natural environment.
In 1976, Park decided that conditions in rural Korea needed to he addressed as well. He set up Saemaul Movement, the New Village Movement, whose aim was to change for better everything in rural life, from the thatched roofs of farmhouses to the powers of earning and enjoyment of the whole farm family. Along with the implementation of these measures, the government also instituted the Saemaul Movement with great fanfare.
The movement, launched by Park in the fall of 1971, was to be a highly organized, intensively administered campaign to improve the environmental quality of rural life through projects undertaken by villagers themselves who were aided by receiving governmental assistance.
Fanners became more confident of their ability to improve the village “environment” through their own cooperative efforts and more convinced of the usefulness of outside official help. According to anthropologist Vincent S.R. Brandt, an insightful observer of the rural scene, the farmers—particularly the younger generation—became more individualistic, confident of their ability to control the environment and to create new wealth through technological innovation, and less hostile and distrustful toward the outside world.21
Under President Park’s leadership, the human and natural resources of the nation were effectively organized for the first time in modern history. The economy began to grow at an annual rate of 9.2% (Ministry of Public Information, 1966).
If one had to enumerate the major policy concerns of Park Chung Hee over the 18 years of his domination of the Korean political scene, economic development and national security would head the list. He felt that these two goals had a mutually reinforcing relationship. For most Koreans, it is Park’s concern for the national and personal prosperity of Korea and Koreans that will undoubtedly be most remembered.
After he became the head of state, Park delivered the State of the Nation message at the National Assembly, and in his indirect dialogue with die voters set forth his major policies of the year. Out of his emphasis on policies came the practice of party representatives delivering keynote speeches at the assembly. This, then, was a step taken in the direction of political modernization.
In the diplomatic area, relations were normalized with Japan in June 1965, putting an end to the hiatus of formal bilateral relations due largely to antagonism stemming from Japan’s occupation of Korea from 1910 to 1945.
It was also at the initiative of President Park that the first formal intra-Korean dialogue was begun. The Red Cross societies of the two parts of Korea began meetings in September 1971 to discuss the question of locating and exchanging information about relatives separated by the South North division. Political contacts were started in May 1972, culminating in the historic South North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, in which South and North Korea agreed to work for peaceful reunification modernization.22
Current Korean economic policy strategy reflects the legacy of President Park Chung Hee.23 His two-decade tenure set the stage for subsequent governments. The strong imposition of “top-down” policy planning and implementation; the targeting of certain preferred industries and commercial entities; the reliance on personal, rather than institutional arrangements as the engine of governance; and a linear approach to economic development that perceived industrial ability as a series of sequential steps moving to greater sophistication are all hallmarks of the Park regime.
References
Gong, B. (2002). The conflict between economic progress and democracy: The case of Korea. Web.
Gregg, D. (1999). Park Chung Hee Despite a dictatorial streak, South Korea’s long-serving President converted an economic basket case into an industrial powerhouse. Time International, 94.
Hahm, S. D., & Plein, L. C. (1977). After development: the transformation of the Korean presidency and bureaucracy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Hurst, G. C, & Lee, C. (1980). The Park Chung Hee presidency in historical perspective. Hanover, NH: The American Universities Field Staff.
Keon, M (1977). Korean phoenix: A nation from the ashes. New Jersey: Prentice Hall International.
Kim, C. S. (1967). Seven years with Korea’s Park Chung Hee. Seoul, Korea: Hollym.
Kim, S. J. (1971). The politics of military revolution in Korea. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Korean Overseas Information Service (1978). A biography of his Excellency Park Chung Hee president of the Republic of Korea. Seoul, Korea: Author.
Korean Overseas Information Service (1993). A handbook of Korea. Seoul, Korea: The Author.
Lee, J. N. (1991). Comparative political Leadership: A study of Lyndon B. Johnson and Park, Chung Hee. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Northern Arizona University.
Mcfarland, A. (1988). Korea’s political crisis. East Asia: An International Quarterly; Brunswick.
Ministry of Public Information (1966). Profile of president Park Chung Hee. Korea: Author.
Park, C. H. (1970). Our nation s path: Ideology of social reconstruction. Seoul, Korea: Hollym.
Park, C. H. (1971) To build a nation. Washington, D.C: Acropolis books ltd.
Williamson, C. E. (1994). Change in the United States strategy toward Northeast Asia during the 1970’s and the Republic of Korea’s response.
Footnotes
- Korean Overseas Information Service, 1993.
- Ministry of Public Information, 1966, p. 54.
- As cited in Yates, 1976, p. 128.
- Yates, 1976.
- Keon, 1977.
- Kim, 1971.
- Kim, 1971.
- Williamson, 1994.
- Hurst & Lee, 1980.
- J. N. Lee, 1991.
- J. N. Lee, 1991.
- Mcfarland, 1988.
- Gong, 2002, p. 2.
- Korean Overseas Information Service, 1978.
- J. N. Lee, 1991.
- Gong, 2002.
- Gregg, 1999.
- McFarland, 1988.
- Korean overseas information service, 1978.
- Park, 1971.
- C. S. Lee, 1991.
- Korean Overseas Information Service, 1993
- Hahm & Plein, 1977.