Introduction
Local and central governments have different roles to play in the response and management of disasters. In this context, disaster means a “sudden catastrophic event that brings any enormous destruction, damage, loss and/or devastation of property and life” (Taylor 1986, ‘Coordination for Disasters’ p.12).
The damages so referred are immeasurable and vary in magnitudes depending on the inflicted region’s geographical location, climatic conditions and earth’s surface degree of vulnerability. During the occurrence of disasters, the social systems of emergency responses remain more often than not rendered disrupted and malfunctioned.
Any hazard that causes immense human suffering amounts to a disaster if it is unpredictable occurring in a large enough speed to out power the response systems, characterized by uncertainty, urgency and the posing of intense threat. For any disaster to take place, people must be living in hazardous places for instance near volcanoes that are active, slopes susceptible to slides, or in regions likely to flood.
In addition, the hazardous phenomenon must take place, whether it is human or naturally instigated. Finally the occurrence of the “disastrous phenomenon must cause immeasurable extensive damages especially where preventive measures have not been taken” (Taylor 1986, ‘The Context of British Politics’ p.57).
Therefore, as the paper unveils, disasters do not include single incidents of human life losses such as a plane crush but rather entangle widespread human sufferings such as an intense earthquake, financial, outbreak of certain infectious diseases, flooding, or even human instigated disasters such as Chernobyl or sea express spill among others.
The essay will look at the roles of the central government in control and management of disasters as contrasted from the local government’s roles and finally evaluate the combined hands of both governance levels to draw a conclusion on which governance level is best placed to cope with disasters management. However, as is exposes, the reverse of the proposition is the case.
Overview of the history and practice of civil defense
Various theoretical perspectives have been formulated by different nations to cope with disasters. For instance, in 1991 “…the UK government launched a review of disasters preparations in the nation” (Alexander 2000, p.71). A national aim geared towards enhancement of nationwide emergencies planning agendas was published in 2003.
The agenda focused on putting into place resilience measures for the nation to respond to aftermaths of disruptive challenges as opposed to measures of risks reduction via anticipation or alternatively redundancy measures. According to Comfort (1994, p 157), such an approach makes an assumption of “…a capacity to reorganize resources and action to respond to actual danger, after it occurs”.
Resilience here entangles specialized protections, which are standardized and centralized methodologies of hazards prediction. According to the civil contingencies bill, all the above mentioned resilient measure are all duties of local governments with an exception of centralization which is a mandate of central governments.
“The general requirement of the bill, as an embodiment of current government thinking, seem to make it clear that central government’s desire is to distance itself from response to local disasters whilst trying to ensure adequate local preparation” (Lupton 1999, p.83).
Crucial to note is that disasters idiosyncrasies are not ardently necessary addressed by putting in place formal ways of disasters preparations. According to Comfort (1994), some of the idiosyncrasies include “need to be flexible in response and to be prepared to innovate” (p.158).
Armed with these idiosyncrasies, any form of disaster response system can be sure to respond to the specific requirement of any new moment. As result “Central government desires to remain detached from local emergencies can be justified in the context and remains consistent with a theme of appropriate decentralization” (Taylor 1986, ‘The Context of British Politics’ p.56).
Historically, differences exist in the manner in which decentralized and centralized nations handle disasters. The centralized governments have “fewer decision takers and that they are placed at a higher level in the response hierarchy” (Alexander 2000, p.164).
The hierarchical and centralized models designed to handle disaster have received enormous critics since they have been perceived as having the capacity to hinder free information flow and consequently posing a tragedy in decision-making.
Modern trends however, are based on coming up with remote structures that are adaptable to specific incidents and which posses amicable familiarity with appropriate responding services.
As Penning-Roswell (1996) observes, “…at least in the case of natural hazard, although there is tendency to focus disaster response at local level, because of the intimate knowledge of the environment in which the emergency is occurring” (p.123) a broader disciplinary and geographical perspectives makes better insights be realized.
Whether the disaster response is well established at local level as opposed to central level of governance is subject to essential requirements such the generic role of the government and the ability to have appropriate leadership during, before and after the occurrence of any disaster both at national and at local levels.
Local and central government Leadership and disasters response
Leadership encompasses willingness and the availability of good will to act in an appropriate way. Leadership, Prior to occurrence of any disaster, is essential despite the fact that more often than not, it is not easily recognizable. Under normal circumstances, deferring traits are demanded from those occupying authority positions during times of emergencies.
Leave alone at local level, the capacity of the leaders at central government level to provide appropriate directive in times of disasters is subject to critics as for example during the hurricane Katrina disaster.
Penning-Roswell (1996) noted that “Mismanagement and lack of preparation in relief effort in response to hurricane Katrina and its aftermath: specifically delayed response by federal flood protection to the flooding of New Orleans, Louisiana was attributed to leadership gaps that occurred on occurrence of the disaster” (p.142).
This poses a big question on the credibility of the leaders to provide quick directions in times of emergency. Despite the fact that the state and local authorities have primarily responsibility to play in response to disasters with consequences of pointing the finger of blame on governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin, the central government slow response was particularly to be to be noted.
The central government has all the essential resources that can be mobilized for quick response to disasters but the beaurocracy to be followed such as the requirement of the financial and assessment of the damages caused before the actual release of state resources to deal with the disasters compounds the problem.
Even though the local authorities may be well familiar with the environmental conditions of their localities and hence well positioned to determine the rescue services required much quickly, some disasters exceed their financial allocations or rescue equipments wealth.
In most situations, those who are responsible for making urgent decisions on behave of a state are normally at the top hierarchical leadership levels. However, it takes some remarkable time before these leaders are acquainted with magnitude of damages due to the hierarchical established information flow channels with a repercussion of delayed rescue missions.
If the local governments were conferred with, the requisite ability to make quick decisions that can enable them to divert funds that were initially intended for other local government functions to the response of the disasters. It should be noted, “…if a consistently effective response to disasters is to be approved at the local level the realizable approach to the leadership role in time of crises is required” (Penning-Roswell 1996, p.151).
According to the work of De Waal (2005) “ rises tend to produce responses that require swift decisions to be made by relatively small groups of senior managers in order to deal with short term threats and that administrative and organizational centralization is a byproduct of this initial response” (Para 7). Small group of decision makers as a result has a capacity to make quick decisions In the event of crisis.
Such a scenario is typically to be found in the at local government level if at all they have all the necessary resources to mobilize. A critic to this line of view would argue that, an assumption that the leaders in the central government would assume their acquaintance with unfamiliar environment and release funds to cater for disasters is anticipated.
Another obstacle in arguing that the local governments are well positioned to deal with disasters than central governments is their skill-level of diversification required which in most cases not possible.
Alexander (2000) says that, “relying entirely on local lead in the response to a disaster requires that a very substantial number of seniors and middle management officers are appropriately selected and trained for the role, one that might never occur in their careers” (p.88).
With the increased pressure on resources allocation, issues confining the local authorities to particular mechanism of arriving at decisions raises questions about local governments ability to make rescue plans independently and if at all they are given this opportunity, would such plans be up to date and available at the time of disaster occurrence?
Research conducted by Pitt (2007, Para. 2) called upon the “government to show leadership and urgently set out the process and timescale for improving resilience in UK”. In his report, he identified the central government being at the best possible position to solve disastrous problems since it is the one, which has the capacity to make appropriate nationwide binding policies to help curb disasters.
Considering two alternatives, for disasters to be dealt with appropriately at local level, some randomness in training of staff is essential. The other way out is to deploy specialists of different disaster response skills management to all local authorities. This evidently is not possible since the nature of disasters is normally random and characterized by infrequent events.
An example of such an encounter is the Exxon Valdez oil spillage in Alaska disaster. The communities in Alaska have experienced distinctive historic disasters. As Browning and Shetler (1992) note, “three major disasters have occurred in this region during the twentieth century, each the largest of its kind in north America: Katmai eruption of 1912, the great Alaskan earthquake of 1964 and the Exxon Valdez oil spillage” (p.477).
With occurrence of disasters in the same region, local communities acquired noble skills in disaster management accompanied by organizational skills. Browning and Shetler noted in their study of Exxon Valdez oil spillage disaster that, “…creativity, knowledge, energy and organization of local communities are sources that are not adequately tapped under the current contingency planning process” (p.480).
However, were the skills reflected in the Exxon Valdez oil spillage, how much did local authorities contribute to the disaster management? From the rapid and swift movement of the central government to contain the Katmai eruption in 1912, it clearly indicates that the central government, through appropriate leadership has a better position to contain disasters.
This remains possible by provision of funds urgently to aid in the evacuation, resettlement and provision of essential humanitarian services to the victims: what the local governments despite having adequate local environmental knowledge lack.
The generic role of the central and local governments
The central government has a historic generic responsibility to protect and manage its society to ensure maximum welfare and services delivery. Disaster management is one of such indigenous societal responsibilities that the central government must play. However, in an attempt to save money, it diverts the responsibility to the local authorities while not considering the effectiveness and efficiency of the response.
The generic responsibility of the central government to cope with big disasters within a nations surfaces evidently in Pitt’s work on the report of flooding disaster in the united kingdom. He pointed out that “the government should provide local resilience forums with the inundation maps of reservoirs to enable them to assess risks and plan for contingency, warning and evacuation” (Pitt 2007, Para. 5).
The local government thus functions under the directives of the central government. It can thus be argued that in case the central government does not respond sufficiently to provide the right and within the right time, the necessary strides that need to be taken by the local authorities to respond to certain disasters, then the whole response process may end up being slowed or unsuccessful altogether.
The government must act first in an attempt to lay out the foundation of the response process by ensuring that “critical infrastructure is as resilient as possible, whilst essential services providers should become considerably more active in local and national emergency preparedness and response” (Pitt 2007, Para. 6). Furthermore, the environmental agencies are more often than not under the control of the central government.
As a result according to Cabinet Office Strategy Unit (2002), the environment agencies responsibility to “ play their part by providing infrastructure operators with a specialized site-specific flood warning service, offering longer lead times to enable defenses to be set up in time”(p.79) depend on the central government willingness to take up its generic roles.
Foucault argues, “…the neo-liberalist tradition of developed western nations shies away from too much state intervention and instead champions individual freedom and rights” (Lupton 1999, p.86). It is now that the local governments should come in, despite their limited capacity to cope with certain disasters sufficiently to aid the central government.
According to Pitt (2007), the local governments should play a significant responsibility to facilitate management of risks of local flood by “taking the lead in tackling local problems of flooding and co-coordinating all relevant agencies” (Para. 7).
He further adds, “Upper tier authorities should establish oversight and scrutiny committees to review the work undertaken to reduce flood risks and publish annual updates on the work undertaken” (Pitt 2007, Para. 11). However, this is a single noble role of the local government as identified by Pitt, which for its success must depend to large extent on the central government’s responsibility to make and implement facilitating policies.
On the other hand, disasters do not just present danger moments but rather the danger process. Managing the entire process is a mandate of the central government as part of its generic roles. Comfort (1994) was to the opinion that “a good deal of political decision making is now about managing risks-risks which do not originate in the political sphere. Yet have to be politically managed” (p.161).
The largest political decisions with nationwide impacts are generally more affiliated to the central government than it is to the local governments. The central government via the established political systems has the noble role to ensure political decisions are arrived to such that they contribute to the overall welfare of the society nationally.
From a different perspective, politics evolution and the associated impacts on central government generic duties are in a manner that translates the task of risks management to a serious issue that deserves more of central government address than the local government.
The central government can be able to adjust certain provisions so that disasters can be managed in a humane way without interfering with the individuals’ stakes. Take for example, the flooding disaster.
The central government is capable of relocating flood victims to some certain selected land acquired through revocation of ownership of lands since in many countries; the central government is mandated to regulate and control use of public land by the constitution. On the other hand, the local government only utilizes the land as stipulated by the central government.
Responses by local government to disasters are normally received with critics. For instance, the response of sea express spill in UK resulted to the establishment of joint response centre (JRC) to address the problem.
As Alexander (2000) notes “ the conflict of normal services versus preparation for major incident manifested itself here in that the planning process that supported the JRC had not taken into account the effects of local government organizations…” (p.121).
Again, the express disaster resulted to existence of multiple cells of operation, which were clearly not integrated and lacked robust and clear coordination process. The ability of the local governments to go beyond local issues either at political or operational level remains questionable.
Conclusion
The essay has made efforts to show that coordination, leadership and the generic responsibilities attributed to local and the central governments coupled with flexibility and innovation are essential elements of disaster management.
These elements draw much of their necessary inputs from the central government so that they become robust and evenly distributed within jurisdiction borders without attracting contrasting or parallelism ideologies and stands. A singly established national disaster response agency cannot pragmatically deal with multiple and widely spread disasters alone.
The local governments must thus take up, play ardently their anticipated roles, and support the local communities in times of disasters occurrence.
However, a question arises on how reconciliation of numerous established local disasters response agencies routine operational imperatives can be harmonized to ensure a common, efficient and effective effort designed to ensure central objectives of public, environment and society protection from escalation of harm emanating from disastrous occurrences.
As a result, central government stands up high being at a better position to respond to crisis and disasters than local governments.
References
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Cabinet Office Strategy Unit., 2002. Risk: Improving Government’s Capability to Handle Risk And Uncertainty. London: Cabinet office.
Comfort, L., 1994. Risk & Resilience: Inter-Organizational Learning Following the Northridge Earthquake of 17 January 1994. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 2 (3), pp. 157-170.
De Waal, A., 2005. An Imperfect Storm: Narratives of Calamity in a Liberal-Technocratic Age. Web.
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