Introduction
Although democracy in Nigeria has given citizens an opportunity to freely express themselves, it has also been the cause of serious political and economic conflicts between different ethnic groups in the country. With at least 140 million inhabitants, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country with regional power of economic, political and military influence (Clarke, 2013).
The country has, however, gone through serious conflicts ignited by religious affiliations that have led to the loss of many lives over the years (Handley, 2013). According to findings drawn from different case studies, there is a complex relationship that exists between religion and development in Nigeria.
On one hand, widely shared visions of development among Christian and Muslim groups suggest that they are indeed united by jointly held values. Religious groups even provide both criticism and guidance to the state sector on development matters.
However, a reflection on the strong competition that characterizes relations between Christians and Muslims are indicative of the fact that the shared values divide rather than unite religious groups in their development activities.
As a result, where religious groups offer to open their provision of development to non-members, especially across the Christian-Muslim divide, such offers have always been viewed with suspicion.
Furthermore, the existing religious competition appears to be fueled not only by Christian-Muslim relations at the central level but also by the nature of links that these groups have with the government of the day.
Effects of Christian-Muslim Conflict on Economic, Political, and Social System
As noted by Williams and Shenley (2013), successive Nigerian presidents have failed to deal with the challenge of spiraling violence between Christians and Muslims in an ongoing religious conflict in the country.
While President Obasanjo and President Goodluck Jonathan are Christians from the south, President Yar’Adua was a northern Muslim who was involved in implementing sharia law, seen as part of the problem. Since 1999, the resulting clashes have claimed more than 14,000 people (Williams & Shenley, 2013).
Among the many challenges faced by President Goodluck Jonathan has been to contain the growing reach of the radical Islamist group Boko Haram. Formed in 2002, the sect has been seeking the eventual imposition of sharia law across all of Nigeria.
The group began to arm itself and in 2009, clashes with Nigerian security forces left an estimated 700 people dead. As noted by Williams and Shenley (2013), small scale attacks were originally restricted to government and security targets in the eastern city of Maiduguri, where Boko Haram evolved.
In August 2011, the suicide bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja left 21 dead and many more injured, raising the level to high profile targets. In January 2012, the Nigerian military killed 12 alleged Boko Haram insurgents during a gun battle in Maiduguri.
Since then, sporadic attacks have continued, including bomb blasts in several cities. Around the same time, gunmen in Kano entered police buildings and freed some of their members who had been arrested. They then proceeded to drive around the city in cars and on motorcycles, battling with police and shooting indiscriminately at passers-by.
In total, 32 policemen and 150 civilians were killed. In February 2012, the army headquarters in Kaduna was attacked, and another church was destroyed in Suleja, near Abuja.
Although the major target for Boko Haram was the Christians community, the group soon started targeting fellow Muslims, particularly those associated with the government (Ahmed, 2013). In July 2012, for example, a teenage suicide bomber blew himself up in the central mosque of Maiduguri, killing five people and injuring six others.
This seems certain to continue as a serious national security issue for President Goodluck Jonathan for the duration of his term in office. The relationships between state governments and religious organizations are characterized not only by very different approaches on both sides, but also by mutual distrust.
Successful cooperation between the two sectors is not the norm but rather the result of an incorporation of specific religious groups into the state for political reasons.
In most cases, this practice of politically motivated incorporation has led to serious consequences for the country, as excluded groups suspect those who have close ties with the government of corruption and other undesirable acts.
Clearly, the shared engagement in development by religious groups does not necessarily reflect a shared identity that could provide a lasting solution to the conflict in Nigeria.
This, therefore, implies that religious competition itself needs to be addressed in order to provide development through religious organizations that is successful and inclusive at all levels.
Beyond their ability to form or participate in larger religious or civic debates, religious groups also provide development. It is thus important to assess how relevant the shared concern for Nigeria and Nigerians at the practical level is.
Many religious groups are united by the critique of the failure of the central and state governments to deliver welfare to Nigerian citizens and, this suggests that they could be important participants in a national dialogue about the future of the country.
Conclusion
From the discussion presented in this paper, it is clear that religious identity plays a crucial role in the country’s national life as well as its economic and political situation. The internal dynamics of Islam in northern Nigeria remain obscure not only to outsiders but also to Nigerian elites regardless of whether Christians or Muslims.
There is, therefore, a need for the country to thoroughly reform its politics in order to mitigate the domestic drivers of religious and ethnic conflict. To accomplish this, President Goodluck Jonathan must ensure the full engagement of the Nigerian government at all levels.
Even though Nigeria’s foreign friends could provide technical assistance if requested, such help is usually quite minimal (Gorder, 2012).
Without underestimating the shared rhetorical engagement, the practical provision of development is divisive in different ways and illustrates that the assumption of a unified faith factor as part of a cohesive civil society is problematic.
In many sectors of the economy, religious development activities reflect unequal resource bases, which have been used historically by some groups to their advantage.
Moreover, the growing political relevance of religious groups over time, and their unequal inclusion into politics at the state level are seen to have contributed to the deepening of the political and religious divisions in the country.
As religious competition derives to a large extent from the uneven inclusion of different religious groups into the state for political reasons, the state itself needs to reconsider its techniques of engagement with religious groups below the national level.
The activities surrounding the conflict are certainly part of wider social dynamics, in which the shared interest of religious groups play as much of a role as historical differences and ongoing political competition.
References
Ahmed, A. (2013). The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Clarke, M. (2013). Handbook of Research on Development and Religion. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Gorder, A. C. (2012). Violence in God’s Name: Christian and Muslim Relations in Nigeria. Seattle, Washington: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
Handley, M. (2013). The Violence in Nigeria: What’s Behind the Conflict? US: Time World.
Williams, L. & Shenley, M. (2013). Nigeria. Guilford, Connecticut: Bradt Travel Guides Ltd.