Robert Jeshion’s “The Epistemological Argument against Descriptivism”
Jeshion explores the validity and strength of the epistemological argument using logic and arguments of descriptivism. Jeshion explores the logic behind the epistemological argument concerning strong descriptivism, including an appendix expressing the associations between the epistemological argument and weak descriptivism. Jeshion says that the epistemological argument goes against descriptivism, beginning with the descriptivism about proper names which, when applied to the logical argument against it, proves descriptivism false. The author states that the main problem with the argument is that there is no supportive evidence to prove one of its premises.
Jeshion explores the problem with an argument against descriptivism by reviewing most of the popular arguments and proving why they do not hold up. The point of the paper is not to disprove the argument against descriptivism entirely, but to point out the insufficiency of the existing arguments. The author concludes by stating that the arguments made in the paper prove that support for descriptivism rests on an insubstantial epistemological thesis. In what seems like the author’s departure from mainstream, conventional logical philosophy and specifically epistemology, is that Jeshion makes clear that the paper is not meant to “clear the way for the descriptivist” (Jeshion 20). The author claims not to agree with the view at all, while not denying the possibility of a substantial epistemological argument against descriptivism. The major break the author makes though, is denying the soundness of the epistemological argument against descriptivism, specifically regarding proper names, that has otherwise had strong foundations in epistemological philosophy. This is a unique trait of the paper because the author intends, and arguably succeeds in deconstructing a widely popular theory.
Scott Cook and John Brown’s “Bridging Epistemologies”
Authors Scott Cook and John Brown explore the nature of knowledge, the essential root of epistemological philosophy, in this essay. They regard this innate understanding of knowledge as something one possesses, while incorporating what this “possession” definition leaves out—the knowing evident in the actions of a single or group. This second type of knowledge, the idea of “knowing” is not something a person possesses but something one commits or acts upon. The epistemology of possession focuses on explicit knowledge over tacit knowledge, and the knowledge possessed by one as opposed to that of which many can possess.
The essay offers an in depth exploration of epistemology of possession, and in turn, the epistemology of practice, breaking it down into sections like knowledge and knowing, and productive inquiry. The chief theory the paper develops is that differentiating among the terms of explicit, tacit, individual, and group knowledge is helpful to understanding the function of organizations and groups and how they receive and process knowledge. This is a significant theory but it reminds us that, within the philosophy of epistemology itself, the crucial task of understanding the various ways we are exposed to knowledge, especially in a group or organizational setting because each of the four elements of knowledge explored in the paper cover their own unique area of the understanding of knowledge. The authors go on to emphasize the importance of understanding the possession of knowledge and the act of knowing as contributing to each other as opposed to conflicting with each other. Instead, the authors say, knowledge should be considered a tool of knowing.
Paul Bloomfield’s “Virtue Epistemology and the Epistemology of Virtue”
This article explores a philosophical belief of the ancient Greeks that still applies in our time—the belief that virtues are skills. The author begins with an exploration of the nature of skills, including that skills have an intellectual foundation or logos and that possessing a skill means that the person who possesses inherently understands the logos of the skill, is able to problem solve, and has experience with the problems and nature of the skill. The article continues to provide two scenarios in which the argument for moral epistemology stands up.
Basically, the author argues that if one thinks of a virtue as a skill, then in applying the theory that one must understand the logos of the skill, the virtue-as-skill denotes the existence of a moral epistemology that is as philosophically relevant as general epistemology. The significance of this article is that it encourages us to examine our own beliefs of virtue, and whether in an intellectual realm based largely on logic we can allow this type of moral intellectuality to hold up as strongly as others. As the author states, we can also use this knowledge to understand the epistemological arguments for and against a given virtue-as-skill, and to evaluate the value of a particular virtue in the intellectual world. Among its main points, this paper shows that moral knowledge is on the same level as an intellectual knowledge, and therefore understanding morality and being righteous or virtuous is a type of intelligence.
Aaron M. Pallas’s “Preparing Education Doctoral Students for Epistemological Diversity”
Pallas begins the article by explaining the complexity presented to the educational field in the wake of ever-varying perspectives of epistemological philosophy. The author claims that the multitude of views presents an obstacle for academic research, especially for the faculty that seeks to guide doctoral programs that are raising the next generation of academic researchers. He considers the bevy of perspectives to be a challenge because the academic world continues to globalize and broaden its scope, and the epistemological theories that are being developed today must be understood by those leading doctoral programs so that the students are well prepared for the epistemological diversity that may deter them from making accurate and updated research and criticism. Pallas uses Wenger’s ideas to develop suggestions as to how to prepare doctoral students for this new level of research.
He explains that educational researchers being taught at universities are exposed to the community only on a local level, and that this creates a lack of access to varying views on epistemology since they only have connections to a limited number of faculty members in their area, which he calls “communities of practice”. Thus, Pallas charges faculty involved in grooming this new generation of researchers to challenge themselves and their students by elevating “the discussion and consideration of epistemology by both faculty and students in their schools of education” (Pallas 5). He continues to offer a multitude of ideas he has developed to help faculty learn how to further develop their doctoral students’ research and critical thinking skills, which can in turn improve the epistemological diversity and understanding of the engaged members of the faculty themselves. The significance of this article has implications throughout the academic world and beyond. Pallas’s arguments denote the effects of globalization on our ways of thinking. Because we have access and awareness to the rest of the world, we receive their new ways of thinking and must account for them. This is especially true in the world of philosophy, and even more so in the area of epistemological philosophy which must consider all the knowledge and theories provided to truly identify the true and substantial nature of knowledge.
Works Cited
Bloomfield, Paul. “Virtue Epistemology and the Epistemology of Virtue” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 60, No. 1, (2000), pp. 23-43.
Brown, John. Cook, Scott. “Bridging Epistemologies: The Generative Dance between Organizational Knowledge and Organizational Knowing” Organization Science, Vol. 10, No. 4, (1999), pp. 381-400.
Jeshion, Robin. “The Epistemological Argument against Descriptivism” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64, No. 2, (2002), pp. 325-345.
Pallas, Aaron. “Preparing Education Doctoral Students for Epistemological Diversity” Educational Researcher, Vol. 30, No. 5, (June-July 2001), pp. 6-11.