The parties involved in the case are the U.S government and Microsoft Corporation. The main issue, in this case, is whether the law enforcement agency in the U.S can compel Microsoft which is a communication service provider to reveal the content of digital information that has been stored outside the U.S borders. The Stored Communication Act (SCA) dispels the government’s position even though its contents are not very clear (Eastton & Taylor, 2011).
SCA only allows the government to access contents of information that have exceeded 180 days using a subpoena, a court order, or a warrant. On the contrary, the government argues that subpoena may lead to the disclosure of information (email) despite the above duration. However, Microsoft is of the opinion that the warrant which was issued required extraterritorial search as well as seizures of the data stored in its Ireland data center (Whitman & Mattord, 2011).
According to Microsoft, it is only possible for digital data search to take place where data is stored and not from a point where data is remotely accessed. Since rule 41 does not provide authorization for extraterritorial application, it is impossible for the government to execute the search in Ireland. Therefore, the government cannot force Microsoft to provide the required data (Eastton & Taylor, 2011).
In its defense, the government responded that it is impossible for the U.S to avoid compliance by sticking to SCA regulations by storing the data abroad. They further argued that the warrant is not affected by the location of data since the issue is whether the required information is in the custody of the service provider. It has nothing to do with location (Seigfried-Spellar, Flores, & Griffin, 2015).
Magistrate Judge Francis denied Microsoft’s motion to vacate the search warrant. Given the ambiguity, the magistrate reviewed the SCA’s structure and legislative history for guidance. He later found out that the warrants which were issued under the SCA were hybrids in the sense that some were part warrant and others partially subpoena. A SCA warrant should indicate probable cause to a magistrate. It should also be executed like a subpoena because it is served on a provider who possesses the information (Eastton & Taylor, 2011).
As a result, the warrant’s extraterritorial limits were not implicated and therefore, the concern is whether the provider is able to access the much-needed data. The magistrate further argued that a search can only occur when data is fully reviewed by law enforcement officers in the U.S. He added that the SCA warrant could not compel the government to deploy U.S law enforcement personnel in another country (Church & Li, 2016).
Finally the magistrate backed the government’s opinion and he emphasized that Mutual Legal Assistance treaty (MLAT) process was very “slow and laborious” and that any country can decide to turn down a MLAT request. He added that the U.S does not have MLAT with some nations even though servers can still be located beyond any country’s jurisdiction. This was unlike Microsoft’s reasoning that a provider could only make data or information within its control completely unavailable to law enforcement. Hence, Microsoft lost the case in the entire ruling (Whitman & Mattord, 2011).
On the side of the government, the ruling was fair since it allowed them to access data. On the other hand, Microsoft also learned a positive lesson that it is possible to be flexible for mutual benefit. Microsoft also understand that the SCA was formed in 1986 when internet was only available in the U.S. there is need to adjust the existing laws because internet is globally used in the modern society (Izosimov, Asvestopoulos, & Blomkvist, 2016).
Understanding the differences between various types of cyber cases is critical to business managers and IT professionals because they may be involved in the mechanics of the case or better still glean vital information that can be applied in their organizations especially in regards to cases currently being resolved in the courts.
References
Church, R. L., & Li, W. (2016). Estimating spatial efficiency using cyber search, GIS, and spatial optimization: a case study of fire service deployment in Los Angeles County. London: Cornell University Press.
Eastton, C., & Taylor, J. (2011). Computer Crime, Investigation, and the Law. Boston, MA: Course Technology, Cengage Learning.
Izosimov, V., Asvestopoulos, A., & Blomkvist, O. (2016). Security-aware development cyber-physical systems illustrated with automotive case study. In 2016 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition. London: Leicester University Press.
Seigfried-Spellar, K. C., Flores, B. M., & Griffin, D. J. (2015). Explanatory Case Study of the Authur Pendragon Cyber Threat: Socio-psychological and Communication Perspectives. In Digital Forensics and Cyber Crime. New York: Springer International Publishing.
Whitman, M. E., & Mattord, H. (2011). Reading & Cases in Information Security: Law & Ethics. Boston, MA: Course Technology, Cengage Learning.