Notwithstanding the extraordinarily growing rate of its military and economic power, China claims that other Asian nations should not be afraid of their powerful neighbor. According to Beijing, China has always preferred the soft power of the Confucian Wang Dao (Way of the King) to the hard power of the Legalist Ba Dao (Way of the Hegemon). The discrepancies between the Confucian rhetoric of the decision-making elites and the actual strategic behavior of China has attracted the attention of many scholars, each of them having an opinion of the country’s strategic culture and explaining it through a variety of arguments. The current paper analyzes the views of Alastair Johnston and Yuan-kang Wang on the matter and outlines similarities and divergences in their interpretations.
Confucian strategic paradigm involves the Confucian idea of just or righteous war. Under its premises, the deployment of violence is allowed under some circumstances. One way of justifying war is when it is initiated by legitimate authority.1 The other condition under which violence is approved is its use with the aim of punishing the unruly.2 The Chinese people claim that the Confucian paradigm impacted their choice of finding non-violent solutions to significant security issues. However, scholars argue that Confucian paradigm does not in fact prevail in Chinese choices of resolving the problems. Both Johnston and Wang consider that the actual paradigm preferred by China has little, if not to say none at all, to do with culture. Still, they disagree in their explanations of what constitutes China’s strategy.
According to Johnston, the security paradigm of any culture rests on the answers to three broad questions about the place that the war occupies in human affairs, the nature of the enemy, and the efficiency of military force.3 These questions form the central paradigm, and answers to them explain the methods of managing security threats. Johnston considers China’s assumptions to belong to the parabellum paradigm that originates from Latin and means “if you want peace, prepare for war.”4 As Johnston argues, China employs this paradigm despite claiming its adherence to Confucian ideas of just war. According to the scholar, the parabellum paradigm “stands in contrast with the standard image of Chinese strategic thought” mentioned in the majority of scholarly works.5 In his analysis of righteous war, Johnston mentions that it presupposes that “the ends clearly justify the means.”6 Thus, when the ends of the war are considered righteous, its means automatically become righteous, as well. According to Johnston, righteousness does not limit one’s choices but rather “opens them up.”7 An example of such an assumption is that when an unrighteous action such as invasion is taken with a moral aim, it should be regarded as a righteous one. In some sense, righteousness may be defined as putting things in order. Thus, when such ordering is done legitimately, the process is just. When the ruler cannot employ benevolence, he has to use force.8
As well as Johnston, Wang analyzes the tradition of just war and its relation to the Chinese strategy. Wang also remarks that China’s “culture of antimilitarism” does not reject military force.9 Even Confucius, as Wang mentions, supported the need for military preparedness, but he estimated its significance “behind people’s livelihood and trust in government.”10 Thus, Wang agrees with Johnston that the use of force is allowed and even recommended when there are morally justifiable reasons for doing so. However, it is also necessary to take into consideration the fair treatment of civilians and the need to withdraw as soon as the just cause has been served.11
Another point of agreement between the two scholars is the understanding of cultural realism. Being the opposite of Confucian pacifism, cultural realism considers that China opts to use force to “counter external aggression,” but the root of such choice is found in the country’s strategic culture.12 Supporting Johnston’s opinion concerning parabellum paradigm, Wang remarks that the material structure of international politics is viewed through the cultural prism that gives it meaning. Under such an explanation, there is no independent causal power in the material structure. The actual impact of the changes in relative capabilities on the country’s strategic preferences is reflected through the cultural lens. Through such a lens, it was easier for the decision makers to realize the importance of structural changes and make resolutions regarding strategies.13
While both Johnston and Wang agree on a number of issues concerning the definition of China’s strategy, there is a significant divergence in their approach to strategic culture. In Wang’s view, strategic culture cannot explain China’s strategic choices and its exercise of power.14 The author remarks that these choices are based on structural realism rather than “some mythical strategic culture.”15 In his explanation of structural realism, Wang mentions that according to this paradigm, the anarchic structure of the world’s system compels the countries to fight for power.16 Moreover, Wang remarks that the impact of cultural differences on the countries’ security conduct is rather insufficient. Since the structure of the system develops similar motivations, all great powers are considered to be similar.17
Therefore, when these powers find themselves in similar structural circumstances, there are almost no divergences between the international conduct of an autocratic state and that of a democratic one. Wang distinguishes between offensive and defensive structural realism as the possible responses to the anarchic security settings.18 Thus, Wang views structural realism as an effective attempt to reject strategic culture. Meanwhile, Johnston remarks that the very idea of strategic culture intimidates the basic assumptions of structural realism, thus rejecting Wang’s argument. According to Johnston, it is possible to explain the baffling disagreement between China’s Confucian strategic culture and its real conduct without resorting to the rejection of strategic culture.19
The analysis of a lecture and the articles makes it possible to draw the following conclusions. Firstly, both Johnston and Wang disagree with a common belief that China conforms to Confucian idea of righteous war. While there are many explanations of this concept and while many researchers choose to agree with China’s statement that it adheres to its principles, Wang and Johnston reject such an opinion. Secondly, Johnston and Wang agree that China’s strategic choices cannot be explained by strategic culture. However, there is one major disagreement between the two author’s views on the ineffectiveness of strategic culture. Wang belittles the role of strategic culture by arguing that China’s strategic choices are formulated under the influence of structural realism. On the other hand, Johnston considers that the idea of strategic culture undermines the ideas of structural realism, thus arguing that China’s strategic choices can be explained neither by strategic culture nor by structural realism.
Footnotes
- Lecture 4: Chinese Strategic Culture, 2.
- Lecture 4, 2.
- Alastair Johnston, Cultural Realism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 61.
- Lecture 4: Chinese Strategic Culture, 2.
- Johnston, Cultural Realism, 61.
- Ibid., 70.
- Ibid., 70.
- Alastair Johnston, Cultural Realism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 70.
- Yuan-kang Wang, Harmony and War (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2010), 18.
- Wang, Harmony and War, 18.
- Ibid., 18.
- Ibid., 19.
- Yuan-kang Wang, Harmony and War (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2010), 20.
- Lecture 4: Chinese Strategic Culture, 4.
- Lecture 4, 4.
- Wang, Harmony and War, 21.
- Ibid., 21.
- Lecture 4: Chinese Strategic Culture, 4.
- Lecture 4, 4.