Influence of Jomina’s Ideas on Development of U.S. Military Thinking in the First Half of Nineteenth Century
Jomini’s ideas had a massive influence on the development of the United States’ military thinking in the first half of the nineteenth century. According to Tucker (45), during this time, the United States was trying to develop an organized military system but lacked strong philosophies that would guide them. Peskin (24) says that the United States’ military heavily borrowed some of the Jomina’s concepts. One of the main military concepts that the United States army borrowed from this war strategists was the need to always be on the offensive.
He argued that it is better to attack than to be under attack. He believed that it takes an enemy a lot of time and resources to reorganize itself if it is attacked when it least expected. This is one of the main concepts that the American military has embraced since then. In the First World War and the Second World War, the United States used this tactic and it enabled it to achieve success.
Jomini’s war concepts are based on 4 maxims, all of which the United States’ military has embraced in modernizing its way of war. The first one is the need to strike an enemy successively upon decisive points (Tucker and Fredriksen 113). This is meant to suppress the enemy and make them unable to respond. The second maxim is to engage the factions of the enemy with bulk. Bulk gives the army an upper hand in terms of strength of numbers. This second maxim supports the third one which emphasizes using mass at decisive points. It holds that when attacking an enemy at a strategic point, using a large number of officers is highly encouraged (Waddell 48). Finally, Jomina emphasizes on the need to have proper timing and the right energy. All these concepts were embraced by the United States’ military in the first half of the nineteenth century.
Clausewitzian concept of ‘the fog of war’
According to Campbell (87), the fog of war refers to “The uncertainty in situational awareness experienced by participants in military operations.” It is a situation where a military force is completely unaware of the plans of its enemy and when it can strike. It also explains a situation where a military knows very little about its capacity. This concept may exert influence on the outcome of a campaign. If a military unit is not aware of its enemy, then it may not know when and how to strike. It may not know the intentions of the enemy and how to counter it. It may also lack the knowledge of how to organize itself in case it is necessary to organize a counteroffensive.
It means that a possible outcome in such a situation would be a terrible defeat in the hands of an enemy. This concept is very useful because it defines what a military unit should avoid. As Benn (90) says, to avoid ‘fog of war’ situation, a military unit needs to engage in the active gathering of intelligence. By gathering relevant intelligence, a military unit will be able to understand the plans of the enemy, its military capacity, and how to counter its activities. A military unit will also know how to respond in case of an attack.
Works Cited
Benn, Carl. The War of 1812: The Fight for American Trade Rights. New York: Rosen Pub, 2011. Print.
Campbell, Ballard. American Wars. New York: Facts on File, 2012. Print.
Peskin, Lawrence. Captives and Countrymen: Barbary Slavery and the American Public, 1785-1816. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1900. Print.
Tucker, Spencer, and John Fredriksen. The Encyclopedia of the War of 1812: A Political, Social, and Military History. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2012. Print.
Tucker, Spencer. Almanac of American Military History. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2013. Print.
Waddell, Steve. United States Army Logistics: From the American Revolution to 9/11. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010. Print.